This paper presents a game theoretic decentralized electric vehicle charging schedule for minimizing the customers' payments, maximizing the grid efficiency, and providing maximum potential capacity for ancillary services. Most of the available methods for electric vehicle charging assume that the customers are rational, there is low-latency perfect two-way communication infrastructure without communication/computation limitation between the distribution company and all the customers, and they have perfect knowledge about the system parameters. To avoid these strong assumptions and preserve the customers' privacy, we take advantages of the regret matching and the Nash Folk theorems. In the considered game, the players (customers) interact and communicate locally with only their neighbors. We propose a mechanism for this game which results in a full Nash Folk theorem. We demonstrate and prove that the on-off charging strategy provides maximum regulation capacity. However, our mechanism is quite general, takes into account the battery characteristics and degradation costs of the vehicles, provides a real time dynamic pricing model, and supports the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) and modulated charging protocols. Moreover, the developed mechanism is robust to the data disruptions and takes into account the long/short term uncertainties.

Many problems in multiagent networks can be solved through distributed learning (state estimation) of linear dynamical systems. In this paper, we develop a partial-diffusion Kalman filtering (PDKF) algorithm, as a fully distributed solution for state estimation in the multiagent networks with limited communication resources. In the PDKF algorithm, every agent (node) is allowed to share only a subset of its intermediate estimate vectors with its neighbors at each iteration, reducing the amount of internode communications. We analyze the stability of the PDKF algorithm and show that the algorithm is stable and convergent in both mean and mean-square senses. We also derive a closed-form expression for the steady-state mean-square deviation criterion. Furthermore, we show theoretically and by numerical examples that the PDKF algorithm provides a trade-off between the estimation performance and the communication cost that is extremely profitable.

Joint energy consumption and trading management is still a major challenge in smart (micro-) grids. The main goal of solving such problems is to flatten the aggregate power consumption-generation curve and increase the local direct power trading among the participants as much as possible. Here, an inclusive formulation for energy management and trading of a Micro/Nano-grid (M/NG) is proposed. Subsequently, a holistic solution to jointly optimizing the internal energy consumption management and external local energy trading for a smart grid including several M/NGs is provided. As the problem is computationally intractable, the proposed approach involves three hierarchical stages. Firstly, a game-theoretic online stochastic energy management model is provided with a reinforcement learning solution by which the M/NGs can schedule their power consumptions. Secondly, an effective incentive-compatible doubleauction is formulated by which the M/NGs can directly trade with each other. Thirdly, the central controller develops an optimal power allocation program to reduce the power transmission loss and the destructive effects of local energy trading. The simulation results validate the efficiency of the proposed framework.