Gerald Young

Prof. Dr. Gerald Young

Glendon College, York University, Toronto, Canada
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

37Years (1990-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
21 September 2015 in Psychological Injury and Law
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
Gerald YoungGerald Young
Gerald Young


1 January 2016
Verified
Book
Closed access
Gerald YoungGerald Young
Gerald Young

27 February 2014 in Psychological Injury and Law
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
Gerald YoungGerald Young
Gerald Young
CLCraig Lareau
Craig Lareau
BPBrandon Pierre
Brandon Pierre

20 November 2015 in Frontiers in Psychiatry
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Gerald YoungGerald Young
Gerald Young
Causality or etiology in psychiatry is marked by standard biomedical, reductionistic models (symptoms reflect the construct involved) that inform approaches to nosology, or classification, such as in the DSM-5 (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, network approaches to symptom interaction (i.e., symptoms are formative of the construct; e.g., McNally, Robinaugh, Wu, Wang, Deserno, & Borsboom, 2014, for PTSD (posttraumatic stress disorder)) are being developed that speak to bottom-up processes in mental disorder, in contrast to the typical top-down psychological construct approach. The present article presents a hybrid top-down, bottom-up model of the relationship between symptoms and mental disorder, viewing symptom expression and their causal complex as a reciprocally dynamic system with multiple levels, from lower-order symptoms in interaction to higher-order constructs affecting them. The hybrid model hinges on good understanding of systems theory in which it is embedded, so that the article reviews in depth nonlinear dynamical systems theory (NLDST). The article applies the concept of emergent circular causality (Young, 2011) to symptom development, as well. Conclusions consider that symptoms vary over several dimensions, including: subjectivity; objectivity; conscious motivation effort; and unconscious influences, and the degree to which individual (e.g., meaning) and universal (e.g., causal) processes are involved. The opposition between science and skepticism is a complex one that the article addresses in final comments.