The threat of hardware reverse engineering is a growing concern for a large number of applications. A main defense strategy against reverse engineering is hardware obfuscation. In this paper, we investigate physical obfuscation techniques, which perform alterations of circuit elements that are difficult or impossible for an adversary to observe. The examples of such stealthy manipulations are changes in the doping concentrations or dielectric manipulations. An attacker will, thus, extract a netlist, which does not correspond to the logic function of the device-under-attack. This approach of camouflaging has garnered recent attention in the literature. In this paper, we expound on this promising direction to conduct a systematic end-to-end study of the VLSI design process to find multiple ways to obfuscate a circuit for hardware security. This paper makes three major contributions. First, we provide a categorization of the available physical obfuscation techniques as it pertains to various design stages. There is a large and multidimensional design space for introducing obfuscated elements and mechanisms, and the proposed taxonomy is helpful for a systematic treatment. Second, we provide a review of the methods that have been proposed or in use. Third, we present recent and new device and logic-level techniques for design obfuscation. For each technique considered, we discuss feasibility of the approach and assess likelihood of its detection. Then we turn our focus to open research questions, and conclude with suggestions for future research directions.
28 April 2021 in IEEE Journal on Emerging and Selected Topics in Circuits and Systems
Training accurate deep learning (DL) models require large amounts of training data, significant work in labeling the data, considerable computing resources, and substantial domain expertise. In short, they are expensive to develop. Hence, protecting these models, which are valuable storehouses of intellectual properties (IP), against model stealing/cloning attacks is of paramount importance. Today's mobile processors feature Neural Processing Units (NPUs) to accelerate the execution of DL models. DL models executing on NPUs are vulnerable to hyperparameter extraction via side-channel attacks and model parameter theft via bus monitoring attacks. This paper presents a novel solution to defend against DL IP theft in NPUs during model distribution and deployment/execution via lightweight, keyed model obfuscation scheme. Unauthorized use of such models results in inaccurate classification. In addition, we present an ideal end-to-end deep learning trusted system composed of: 1) model distribution via hardware root-of-trust and public-key cryptography infrastructure (PKI) and 2) model execution via low-latency memory encryption. We demonstrate that our proposed obfuscation solution achieves IP protection objectives without requiring specialized training or sacrificing the model's accuracy. In addition, the proposed obfuscation mechanism preserves the output class distribution while degrading the model's accuracy for unauthorized parties, covering any evidence of a hacked model.
30 December 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics
Improving the reliability of energy distribution systems is a major concern to multiple parties as they are not only critical infrastructure themselves, but also affect other connected infrastructure. Smart Grids have been proposed to leverage the advantages of Internet of Things (IoT) to allow smarter management and faster recovery of energy distribution systems against disruptions. However, Smart Grid applications require a reliable, lightweight and fast authentication system to realize their potential in a secure manner. In this work, we propose a Strong PUF (physically unclonable function) system that can meet the stringent resource and performance constraints imposed by a Smart Grid operational environment. Our results indicate that the proposed mechanism produces a Strong PUF with close to ideal normalized uniqueness of 50 % and an accuracy of 50 % to modeling attacks using the best known machine learning algorithms. Additionally, our scheme has a low hardware overhead cost of $750~ \mu m^{2}$ in 45 nm technology and a sub-1 ms key generation time, ensuring the entire system is fast and lightweight.
13 November 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers
SRAM-based weak physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have shown promise regarding tamper sensitive key storage and device ID generation. Weak PUFs rely on intrinsic process variations to produce repeatable and unique start-up behavior. However, noise in the system can affect the start-up behavior and introduce errors. A number of solutions, such as fuzzy extraction and error correcting codes have been proposed to alleviate the effect of noise and generate stable keys. Unfortunately, the overhead from these techniques grows superlinearly with increasing error rate. Alternatively, accelerating device aging or burn-in has been shown to reduce start-up error rate significantly, which leads to reduced overhead for error correction. Unfortunately, burn-in is a time-intensive process and accrues significant production cost. This paper proposes a method to reduce the cumulative burn-in time via quantification of the minimum burn-in requirements for chip. We propose a low-cost proxy to measure the degree of process variation of each device at birth and use previously proposed device aging models to determine the burn-in requirements. Our results show that this procedure reduces cumulative burn-in cost without compromising the resultant reliability of weak PUFs. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of having additional PUF cells, alternate weak PUF designs and transistor technologies on burn-in requirements.
22 May 2019 in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have emerged as lightweight hardware security primitives for implementing secure authentication. Strong PUFs rely on random manufacturing process variation to create unique Boolean mappings from input (challenge) to output (output). For secure authentication, challenge to response mappings are required to be unique for each device. However, uniqueness is not guaranteed by design or manufacturing. Testing for uniqueness and weeding out non-unique parts are the only way to ensure uniqueness of devices. Uniqueness testing can be expensive in time as the challenge-responses of the N th device under-test, must be proven to be different from previously tested N - 1 devices, or the device must be discarded. To reduce the time complexity of uniqueness testing, Multi-Index hashing (MIH) was proposed for online testing in high volume manufacturing. Database search using MIH was shown to be fast, but it suffers from high memory cost. In this paper, we address the memory problem of MIH based uniqueness testing by proposing alternative MIH strategies. Our results indicate that the proposed search strategies can significantly reduce the memory cost without sacrificing performance, requiring ≈ 3.35× less memory with just a 17% performance overhead when testing the uniqueness of 1 million PUFs.