Biopesticides have been recognized as viable alternatives to chemical pesticides in controlling agricultural pests for plants and reducing harmful chemical residues. However, small and marginal farmers are facing challenges while adopting biopesticides, namely, high cost and complicated application techniques, resulting in a low level of farmer acceptance. Accordingly, Farmer Producer Organizations (FPOs), voluntarily formed by farmers, develop mutual technical assistance among their members to solve the technical problems of biopesticide adoption. This study assumes that as a new form of farmer cooperative, FPOs have the potential to promote biopesticide adoption through the implementation of collective pesticide adoption (CPA). Along this line, this paper uses a cooperative game-based hybrid method to develop an incentive mechanism of biopesticide adoption for FPOs to implement CPAs. First, we construct a CPA decision model for mixed pesticides (i.e., biopesticides and chemical pesticides) based on multichoice goal programming (MCGP) to compromise the conflicting objectives regarding cost efficiency and chemical residue reduction, thereby obtaining the optimal total cost of pesticide adoption. Second, recognizing the optimal total adoption cost as a baseline, we devise a cooperative game-based cost allocation scheme to maintain farmers' voluntary participation in FPOs. This study demonstrates that the CPA implemented based on our proposed models can at least match if not surpass the economic and environmental performance of farmers' independent pesticide adoption (IPA). We further demonstrate that the proposed cooperative game solution is more suitable for the FPO's cost allocation issue than the eminent solutions, such as the Shapley value.

With the accelerated iteration of global electronic and electrical product updates, the demand for electronic and electrical products presents a new trend in which the life cycle of electronic and electrical products is shortened. Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) products pose a great threat to the global ecological environment, and solving this problem is urgent. Therefore, governments around the world have formulated funding policies for WEEE products, which has led to continuous improvements in such policies. Along these lines, we adopt the circular economy concept, extended producer responsibility theory and life cycle assessment method to comparatively analyse and compare the different fund operation modes in China, Germany, Japan and The Netherlands. In addition, based on the data related to fund policy implementation, we point out the problems in the development of the WEEE industry in China. The analysis results show that although China is the largest WEEE market, it is still in the initial stage and lags behind Western countries in efficiency and cost management. Then, taking as an example ‘Go Green’, an O2O classified recycling platform launched in 2005, this paper performs an extended analysis of the “Internet +” recycling model, which was proposed as a WEEE fund operation solution in China. Finally, we discuss the economic impact of this study on the future implementation and valuation of WEEE fund policy.

In the development of end-of-life (EOL) products recycling, coordinating competing closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) with restricted coalition has become an important topic that has yet to be thoroughly investigated. In this study, we first investigate the possible coalitions for two CLSCs composed of manufacturers and third-party recyclers under a restricted coalition structure, which is used for deriving the characteristic functions representing the bargaining powers of different coalitions and allocating the overall profits. Subsequently, to fairly allocate the maximal profit, we establish a cooperative game in the form of characteristic function for the two CLSCs and use an advanced solution concept (average tree value) to coordinate them. We find that: compared to other non-cooperative and partial cooperative models, the centralized model can always achieve the best performance, e.g., the highest recovery rate. And the profit of the fully centralized model increases linearly with the increase of the cooperation coefficient. When the third-party recyclers of two CLSCs form alliance, the profit of the manufacturer is positively or negatively correlated with the cooperation coefficient due to the difference of the model and price elasticity coefficient. Under the cooperation of two CLSCs third-party recyclers, the relationship between the profit of the third-party recycler, the profit of the single chain system or the profit of the double chain system and the cooperation coefficient increases first and then decreases, but the inflection point is different. The coordination of two competing CLSCs can be well addressed by the allocation scheme proposed in this study, while satisfying the collective and individual rationalities.

Biopesticides are considered as the effective measure to combat environmental consequences brought by chemical pesticides. However, due to the comparatively high price of biopesticides and unreasonable government subsidies, the trade-off between economy, society and environment represents a daunting task for pesticide supply chains. This study establishes a pesticide supply chain including manufacturers, retailer and government to study the production and sales strategies of pesticides under two different structures: monopoly and duopoly. Based on the equilibrium and numerical analyses, we find that: first, only when the government subsidy falls within a reasonable range, it can incentivise the chemical pesticide manufacturer to produce biopesticides in both monopoly and duopoly markets. Interestingly, the subsidy can improve the profit of pesticide supply chain in monopoly market, however the consumer surplus and social welfare are greater in duopoly market with the increase of subsidy. Second, the profit of pesticide supply chain is better after launching biopesticide and the retailer gains more profits in duopoly market than in monopoly market with the increase of farmer’s biopesticide acceptance. Third, the launch of biopesticides can decrease the influence of environment pollution in both market structures, and less environmental impact in monopoly market.