In this paper, the economic design of MSE control chart is extended to the multivariate case. The important feature of this control chart is that it uses the target value instead of the process mean. According to Taguchi’s viewpoint, any deviation from the target value represents a kind of loss. Therefore, we construct the model of economic design by considering not only the control costs occurred in the production process but also the loss resulted to the customer because the quality characteristics shifted from the target value. The expected loss of multivariate squared error is presented and used in the formulated cost model. A True Basic program is used to find the optimum parameters of the sample size, n; the sample interval, h and the width, E, of the control limits of the multivariate MSE chart. Finally, an example is used to illustrate the application of the proposed economic design of the multivariate MSE control chart.
In this paper, we examine the question of how to devise an optimal insurance claim settlement scheme under the constraint of a cap on the amount of the claim payment. We establish objective functions to maximize the net benefit due to exaggerated claims while at the same time maximizing the total expected wealth of the insured. Then, we establish a dual objective function to minimize the total expected loss, including the perspective of the insurer. Finally, we illustrate applications of our work and provide numerical analysis of it along with an example.
14 September 2015 in Quality and Reliability Engineering International
In this paper, we explore the optimal price, default ratio, and capital for insurance companies under social welfare maximization from regulators' perspective. From comparisons of cases under symmetric and asymmetric information in the insurance market, we find that an optimal regulatory objective should be set to maximize social benefit and induce fair benefit distribution in a transparent insurance market, and direct regulation on capital constraint can increase insurance demand and shareholders' benefits in a non-transparent market.
In this article, we discuss how moral hazard affects health care insurance, the social benefit and the harmfulness of moral hazard in health care insurance. We also discuss the relationship between copayment rate and decease risks and indicate that it is necessary to reduce copayment ratio for serious decease in social health care insurance in order to generate social gain. Finally, we carry out sensitivity analysis to illustrate the effect of the change of important parameters on optimal copayment rate.