Tom Lawton

Dr. Tom Lawton

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 February 2020 in Bulletin of the World Health Organization
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IHIbrahim Habli
Ibrahim Habli
TLTom Lawton
Tom Lawton
ZPZoe Porter
Zoe Porter
The prospect of patient harm caused by the decisions made by an artificial intelligence-based clinical tool is something to which current practices of accountability and safety worldwide have not yet adjusted. We focus on two aspects of clinical artificial intelligence used for decision-making: moral accountability for harm to patients; and safety assurance to protect patients against such harm. Artificial intelligence-based tools are challenging the standard clinical practices of assigning blame and assuring safety. Human clinicians and safety engineers have weaker control over the decisions reached by artificial intelligence systems and less knowledge and understanding of precisely how the artificial intelligence systems reach their decisions. We illustrate this analysis by applying it to an example of an artificial intelligence-based system developed for use in the treatment of sepsis. The paper ends with practical suggestions for ways forward to mitigate these concerns. We argue for a need to include artificial intelligence developers and systems safety engineers in our assessments of moral accountability for patient harm. Meanwhile, none of the actors in the model robustly fulfil the traditional conditions of moral accountability for the decisions of an artificial intelligence system. We should therefore update our conceptions of moral accountability in this context. We also need to move from a static to a dynamic model of assurance, accepting that considerations of safety are not fully resolvable during the design of the artificial intelligence system before the system has been deployed.

1 February 2020 in Artificial Intelligence
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SBSimon Burton
Simon Burton
IHIbrahim Habli
Ibrahim Habli
TLTom Lawton
Tom Lawton
JMJohn McDermid
John McDermid
PMPhillip Morgan
Phillip Morgan
ZPZoe Porter
Zoe Porter

1 January 2018 in British Journal of Anaesthesia
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TAT.E.F. Abbott
T.E.F. Abbott
AFA.J. Fowler
A.J. Fowler
MCM.S. Chew
M.S. Chew
RPRupert M. Pearse
Rupert M. Pearse
SBScott Beattie
Scott Beattie
TWTroy Wildes
Troy Wildes

1 July 2021 in Artificial Intelligence in Medicine
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YJYan Jia
Yan Jia
CKChaitanya Kaul
Chaitanya Kaul
TLTom Lawton
Tom Lawton
RMRoderick Murray-Smith
Roderick Murray-Smith
IHIbrahim Habli
Ibrahim Habli

5 May 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YJYan Jia
Yan Jia
JMJohn Alexander Mcdermid
John Alexander Mcdermid
TLTom Lawton
Tom Lawton
IHIbrahim Habli
Ibrahim Habli
Established approaches to assuring safety-critical systems and software are difficult to apply to systems employing ML where there is no clear, pre-defined specification against which to assess validity. This problem is exacerbated by the opaque nature of ML where the learnt model is not amenable to human scrutiny. XAI methods have been proposed to tackle this issue by producing human-interpretable representations of ML models which can help users to gain confidence and build trust in the ML system. However, little work explicitly investigates the role of explainability for safety assurance in the context of ML development. This paper identifies ways in which XAI methods can contribute to safety assurance of ML-based systems. It then uses a concrete ML-based clinical decision support system, concerning weaning of patients from mechanical ventilation, to demonstrate how XAI methods can be employed to produce evidence to support safety assurance. The results are also represented in a safety argument to show where, and in what way, XAI methods can contribute to a safety case. Overall, we conclude that XAI methods have a valuable role in safety assurance of ML-based systems in healthcare but that they are not sufficient in themselves to assure safety.

19 February 2024 in Future Healthcare Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TLTom Lawton
Tom Lawton
PMPhillip Morgan
Phillip Morgan
ZPZoe Porter
Zoe Porter
SHShireen Hickey
Shireen Hickey
ACAlice Cunningham
Alice Cunningham
IHIbrahim Habli
Ibrahim Habli