The rapid integration of generative artificial intelligence (AI) into educational environments raises both opportunities and concerns regarding assessment design, academic integrity, and quality assurance. While new generation AI tools offer new modes of interactivity, feedback, and content generation, their use in assessment remains insufficiently pedagogically framed and regulated. In this study, we propose a new framework for generative AI-supported assessment in higher education, structured around the needs and responsibilities of three key stakeholders (branches): instructors, students, and control authorities. The framework outlines how teaching staff can design adaptive and AI-informed tasks and provide feedback, how learners can engage with these tools transparently, and how institutional bodies can ensure accountability through compliance standards, policies, and audits. This three-branch multi-level model contributes to the emerging discourse on responsible AI adoption in higher education by offering a holistic approach for integrating AI-based systems into assessment practices while safeguarding academic values and quality.

In this paper we build a pragmatic model on competition in oligopoly markets. To achieve this goal, we use an approach based on studying the response functions of each market participant, thus making it possible to address both Cournot and Bertrand industrial structures with a unified formal method. In contrast to the restrictive theoretical constructs of duopoly equilibrium, our study is able to account for real-world limitations like minimal sustainable production levels and exclusive access to certain resources. We prove and demonstrate that by using carefully constructed response functions it is possible to build and calibrate a model that reflects different competitive strategies used in extremely concentrated markets. The response functions approach makes it also possible to take into consideration different barriers to entry. By fitting to the response functions rather than the profit maximization of the payoff functions problem we alter the classical optimization problem to a problem of coupled fixed points, which has the benefit that considering corner optimum, corner equilibria and convexity condition of the payoff function can be skipped.

We present a possible kind of generalization of the notion of ordered pairs of cyclic maps and coupled fixed points and its application in modelling of equilibrium in oligopoly markets. We have obtained sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of coupled fixed in complete metric spaces. We illustrate one possible application of the results by building a pragmatic model on competition in oligopoly markets. To achieve this goal, we use an approach based on studying the response functions of each market participant, thus making it possible to address both Cournot and Bertrand industrial structures with unified formal method.We show that whenever the response functions of the two players are identical, then the equilibrium will be attained at equal levels of production and equal prices. The response functions approach makes it also possible to take into consideration different barriers to entry. By fitting to the response functions rather than the profit maximization of the payoff functions problem we alter the classical optimization problem to a problem of coupled fixed points, which has the benefit that considering corner optimum, corner equilibrium and convexity condition of the payoff function can be skipped.

The term ‘waithood’ has become increasingly used to describe the situations of 20-something males and females throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The suggestion is that, following a youth life stage, young adults’ lives stall due to males’ inability to obtain sufficiently stable and salaried employment to enable them to head new family forming households, which leaves young women, most of whom do not enter the labour market, unable to marry. We use quantitative and qualitative evidence from research in three North-West Africa countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) to argue that the situation is more nuanced. We conclude that youth life stage transitions in present-day MENA exhibit a region-specific combination of features. The combination is atypical globally, but neither intolerable for young people in MENA nor unsustainable societally.

In this paper we generalize Hardy–Rogers maps in the context of coupled fixed points. We comment on the symmetry of some of the coefficients involved in the Hardy–Rogers condition, and thus, we deduce a simpler formula. We generalize, with the help of the obtained main theorem, some known results about existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium in duopoly markets. As a consequence, we ascertain that the equilibrium production should be equal for both market participants provided that they have symmetric response functions. With the help of the main theorem, we investigate and enrich some recent results regarding market equilibrium in duopoly markets. We define a generalized response function that includes production and surpluses. Finally, we illustrate a possible application of the main result in the investigation of market equilibrium when the payoff functions are non-differentiable.