We provide a survey of the state of the art ofrational verification: the problem of checking whether a given temporal logic formulaϕis satisfied in some or all game-theoretic equilibria of a multi-agent system – that is, whether the system will exhibit the behaviorϕrepresents under the assumption that agents within the system act rationally in pursuit of their preferences. After motivating and introducing the overall framework of rational verification, we discuss key results obtained in the past few years as well as relevant related work in logic, AI, and computer science.
This paper addresses the problem of autonomous UAV search missions, where a UAV must locate specific Entities of Interest (EOIs) within a time limit, based on brief descriptions in large, hazard-prone environments with keep-out zones. The UAV must perceive, reason, and make decisions with limited and uncertain information. We propose NEUSIS, a compositional neuro-symbolic system designed for effective UAV search and navigation in realistic scenarios. NEUSIS integrates neuro-symbolic visual perception, reasoning, and grounding (GRiD) to process raw sensory inputs, maintains a probabilistic world model for environment representation, and uses a hierarchical planning component (SNaC) for efficient path planning. Experimental results from simulated urban search missions using AirSim and Unreal Engine show that NEUSIS outperforms state-of-the-art baselines for both perception and planning. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of our compositional neuro-symbolic approach in handling complex scenarios, making it a promising solution for autonomous UAV systems in search missions.
20 September 2019 in Logical Methods in Computer Science
Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the possible computation runs of the system; and strategies define the behaviour of agents. Typically, strategies are modelled as functions from sequences of system states to player actions. Analysing a system in such a setting involves computing the set of (Nash) equilibria in the concurrent game. However, we show that, with respect to the above model of strategies (arguably, the "standard" model in the computer science literature), bisimilarity does not preserve the existence of Nash equilibria. Thus, two concurrent games which are behaviourally equivalent from a semantic perspective, and which from a logical perspective satisfy the same temporal logic formulae, may nevertheless have fundamentally different properties (solutions) from a game theoretic perspective. Our aim in this paper is to explore the issues raised by this discovery. After illustrating the issue by way of a motivating example, we present three models of strategies with respect to which the existence of Nash equilibria is preserved under bisimilarity. We use some of these models of strategies to provide new semantic foundations for logics for strategic reasoning, and investigate restricted scenarios where bisimilarity can be shown to preserve the existence of Nash equilibria with respect to the conventional model of strategies in the computer science literature.