The evaluation of the quality of physical unclonable functions (PUFs) is still under research. Most state-of-the-art metrics are found to measure only bias, while correlations, e.g., within the PUF response of a single device, remain unnoticed. In this paper, we introduce spatial autocorrelation analysis (SPACA), which is used in other fields of research, as a method to reveal correlations in the response of single-challenge PUFs. The presented statistics-Moran's I, Geary's c, and Join Count statistic-can be used to test the quality of an implementation using a set of sample devices as well as monitor ongoing production. Their results are also important for selecting an appropriate post-processing of the raw PUF response. Experiments on data sets from three different PUF implementations on field-programmable gate array and application-specific integrated circuit using SPACA show the capabilities of the introduced statistics. An efficient implementation of SPACA in MATLAB was developed to conduct the experiments. We discuss how SPACA can be used in practical testing and suggest to consider SPACA for a future test suite for PUFs.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) leverage manufacturing variations to generate device-specific keys during runtime only, overcoming the need for protection after power-off as for Non-Volatile Memory. The main challenges of PUF-based key storage are reliability of the response and sensitivity to Side-Channel Analysis (SCA). Oscillator-based PUFs are particularly sensitive to frequency spectrum SCA. Existing countermeasures can protect sign-based bit derivation that requires error correction or discarding unreliable bits to achieve reliable key generation. Amplitude-based bit derivation enhances the reliability of oscillator-based PUFs without discarding unsteady response bits, keeping a high entropy. However, existing lightweight countermeasures against SCA are not applicable for this case. This raises the demand for an alternative solution. This work targets the protection of amplitude-based bit derivation combined with the Loop PUF, an oscillator-based PUF primitive well suited for key generation. It presents the Interleaved Challenge Loop PUF (ICLooPUF), a side-channel-hardened offspring of the Loop PUF that uses dynamic challenge interleaving. The SCA-protected PUF primitive is applicable to amplitude-based and sign-based bit derivation methods, and requires a low hardware overhead. Theoretical and experimental results show the efficiency of the protection mechanism.
8 November 2023 in Journal of Hardware and Systems Security
Helper data algorithms reliably extract secrets from physical unclonable functions. The necessary helper data can leak information, though. One state-of-the-art approach to assess the remaining min-entropy is limited to homogeneous bias or correlation, not both. Another one extends this to only local bias without correlation but is limited to short code lengths. This work presents a new approach for determining the min-entropy based on convolving histograms. It provides a better bound and good approximation given arbitrary bias, more realistic correlation effects, and practically relevant code sizes. Experiments on real-world and synthetic data show the benefit of the new method compared with state-of-the-art ones. This work also facilitates a better understanding of how the error correction as post-processing impacts the min-entropy.
15 November 2015 in Journal of Circuits, Systems and Computers
FPGAs promise significant performance improvements for several computations in cloud applications. However, their shared use in multi-tenant scenarios makes them susceptible to attacks. Different from classical scenarios, where the attacker has hardware access to the device, in cloud scenarios the attack is possible only from remote. As a consequence remote SCA attacks gained increasing attention in the last years. These attacks exploit that attacker and victim share with the same FPGA also the same PDN so that operation-dependent voltage fluctuations caused by the victim’s IP are observable by a voltage sensor of the attacker. While previous attacks in this domain focused on cryptographic algorithms, this work provides insights in an attack on a PUF primitive, the Loop PUF. This primitive is an interesting target for the attack since it might be used, e.g., for storing or deriving secret keys on a remote FPGA. We introduce and discuss the setup of such a remote SCA using a TDC-based voltage sensor. With this sensor, we compare the performance of classical and remote SCA attacks on the Loop PUF using two different Artix-7 FPGA and demonstrate and discuss findings regarding sampling frequency and placement. This work extends and deepens the analysis from a previously published analysis at the ASHES Workshop 2022. In particular, it provides insights into the influence of repeated measurements, measurement time, and usage of multiple TDCs on the attack performance. It also discusses the applicability of the attack to further RO-based PUF primitives. Overall the results show that remote SCA attacks on PUFs in a multi-tenant FPGA scenario have to be considered as a severe attack vector in the future.