The brain exhibits a complex temporal structure which translates into a hierarchy of distinct neural timescales. An open question is how these intrinsic timescales are related to sensory or motor information processing and whether these dynamics have common patterns in different behavioral states. We address these questions by investigating the brain's intrinsic timescales in healthy controls, motor (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, locked-in syndrome), sensory (anesthesia, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome), and progressive reduction of sensory processing (from awake states over N1, N2, N3). We employed a combination of measures from EEG resting-state data: auto-correlation window (ACW), power spectral density (PSD), and power-law exponent (PLE). Prolonged neural timescales accompanied by a shift towards slower frequencies were observed in the conditions with sensory deficits, but not in conditions with motor deficits. Our results establish that the spontaneous activity's intrinsic neural timescale is related to the neural capacity that specifically supports sensory rather than motor information processing in the healthy brain.
Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind.
Complete locked-in syndrome (CLIS) resulting from late-stage amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is characterised by loss of motor function and eye movements. The absence of behavioural indicators of consciousness makes the search for neuronal correlates as possible biomarkers clinically and ethically urgent. EEG-based measures of brain dynamics such as power-law exponent (PLE) and Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZC) have been shown to have explanatory power for consciousness and may provide such neuronal indices for patients with CLIS. Here, we validated PLE and LZC (calculated in a dynamic way) as benchmarks of a wide range of arousal states across different reference states of consciousness (e.g., awake, sleep stages, ketamine, sevoflurane). We show a tendency toward high PLE and low LZC, with high intra-subject fluctuations and inter-subject variability in a cohort of CLIS patients with values graded along different arousal states as in our reference data sets. In conclusion, changes in brain dynamics indicate altered arousal in CLIS. Specifically, PLE and LZC are potentially relevant biomarkers to identify or diagnose the arousal level in CLIS and to determine the optimal time point for treatment, including communication attempts.
Time is a key element of consciousness as it includes multiple timescales from shorter to longer ones. This is reflected in our experience of various short-term phenomenal contents at discrete points in time as part of an ongoing, more continuous, and long-term ‘stream of consciousness’. Can Integrated Information Theory (IIT) account for this multitude of timescales of consciousness? According to the theory, the relevant spatiotemporal scale for consciousness is the one in which the system reaches the maximum cause-effect power; IIT currently predicts that experience occurs on the order of short timescales, namely, between 100 and 300 ms (theta and alpha frequency range). This can well account for the integration of single inputs into a particular phenomenal content. However, such short timescales leave open the temporal relation of specific phenomenal contents to others during the course of the ongoing time, that is, the stream of consciousness. For that purpose, we converge the IIT with the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC), which, assuming a multitude of different timescales, can take into view the temporal integration of specific phenomenal contents with other phenomenal contents over time. On the neuronal side, this is detailed by considering those neuronal mechanisms driving the non-additive interaction of pre-stimulus activity with the input resulting in stimulus-related activity. Due to their non-additive interaction, the single input is not only integrated with others in the short-term timescales of 100–300 ms (alpha and theta frequencies) (as predicted by IIT) but, at the same time, also virtually expanded in its temporal (and spatial) features; this is related to the longer timescales (delta and slower frequencies) that are carried over from pre-stimulus to stimulus-related activity. Such a non-additive pre-stimulus-input interaction amounts to temporo-spatial expansion as a key mechanism of TTC for the constitution of phenomenal contents including their embedding or nesting within the ongoing temporal dynamic, i.e., the stream of consciousness. In conclusion, we propose converging the short-term integration of inputs postulated in IIT (100–300 ms as in the alpha and theta frequency range) with the longer timescales (in delta and slower frequencies) of temporo-spatial expansion in TTC.
Our brain processes the different timescales of our environment's temporal input stochastics. Is such a temporal input processing mechanism key for consciousness? To address this research question, we calculated measures of input processing on shorter (alpha peak frequency, APF) and longer (autocorrelation window, ACW) timescales on resting-state high-density EEG (256 channels) recordings and compared them across different consciousness levels (awake/conscious, ketamine and sevoflurane anaesthesia, unresponsive wakefulness, minimally conscious state). We replicate and extend previous findings of: (i) significantly longer ACW values, consistently over all states of unconsciousness, as measured with ACW-0 (an unprecedented longer version of the well-know ACW-50); (ii) significantly slower APF values, as measured with frequency sliding, in all four unconscious states. Most importantly, we report a highly significant correlation of ACW-0 and APF in the conscious state, while their relationship is disrupted in the unconscious states. In sum, we demonstrate the relevance of the brain's capacity for input processing on shorter (APF) and longer (ACW) timescales - including their relationship - for consciousness. Albeit indirectly, e.g., through the analysis of electrophysiological activity at rest, this supports the mechanism of temporo-spatial alignment to the environment's temporal input stochastics, through relating different neural timescales, as one key predisposing factor of consciousness.