Purpose: The study aims to investigate the impacts of Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) and blockchain adoption decisions on the profits and of the supply chain members and emission reductions. Design/methodology/approach: A Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer, retailer and ESCO is formulated and analyzed. When selecting emission reduction methods, the manufacturer must consider the impact of retailer’s blockchain adoption decisions, while retailers similarly determine whether to adopt blockchain based on manufacturer’s strategic choices. Findings: When the retailer adopts blockchain technology, the manufacturer is more inclined to choose ESCO to conduct emissions reduction (ER) even if the cost advantage of the ESCO is not that significant. The adoption of blockchain motivates the manufacturer to make greater efforts in ER. When the manufacturer makes greater efforts in ER, the retailer is more inclined to display ER efforts to attract more consumers by establishing a blockchain system. Originality/value: (1) The study innovatively explores the interaction between blockchain-enabled indirect emission reduction and ESCO’s direct emission reduction, revealing their differentiated impacts on supply chain decisions. (2) The research pioneers the investigation of how retailer’s blockchain adoption decisions influence manufacturers’s different emission reduction approaches, particularly analyzing how blockchain implementation alters the cost–benefit equilibrium between technological transparency and third-party ESCO collaboration.

The rapid rise of live-streaming e-commerce has fostered a new “content clipping” model, in which secondary creators edit and republish anchors’ live-streaming content to promote product sales. While this model can expand market reach and enhance revenue, it also introduces copyright disputes, regulatory challenges, and profit-sharing conflicts among platforms, anchors, and secondary creators. This study develops a three-party evolutionary game model to examine strategic choices regarding platform regulation, anchor authorization, and secondary content creation. Results reveal that excessive regulation may undermine equilibrium and profitability, while appropriate authorization can balance risk and reward. Secondary creators’ participation is sensitive to commission rates and cost–benefit trade-offs. This research contributes to the literature by integrating copyright governance into live-streaming e-commerce game theory and offers actionable insights for designing regulatory mechanisms, optimizing authorization policies, and fostering sustainable multi-party collaboration.