Hans-Peter Weikard

Dr. Hans-Peter Weikard

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

35Years (1992-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2013 in Global Environmental Change
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Journal Article
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RKR.H.E.M. Koppelaar
R.H.E.M. Koppelaar
HWHans-Peter Weikard
Hans-Peter Weikard

6 January 2011 in Social Choice and Welfare
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EAErik Ansink
Erik Ansink
HWHans-Peter Weikard
Hans-Peter Weikard
We analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise the class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, provide two characterisations of one specific rule, and compare sequential sharing rules with three alternative solutions to the river sharing problem.

14 July 2009 in The Manchester School
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HWHans-Peter Weikard
Hans-Peter Weikard

1 September 2005 in Economic Modelling
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HWHans-Peter Weikard
Hans-Peter Weikard
XZXueqin Zhu
Xueqin Zhu

21 February 2015 in Environmental and Resource Economics
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KLKai Lessmann
Kai Lessmann
UKUlrike Kornek
Ulrike Kornek
VBValentina Bosetti
Valentina Bosetti
RDRob Dellink
Rob Dellink
JEJohannes Emmerling
Johannes Emmerling
ZYZili Yang
Zili Yang

1 April 2006 in Oxford Economic Papers
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HWHans-Peter Weikard
Hans-Peter Weikard
MFMichael Finus
Michael Finus
JAJuan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera
Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera
This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement under different sharing rules applied to the gains from cooperation. We use a 12-region model to examine internal and external stability of coalitions. We determine and compare stable coalitions under different surplus sharing rules; for example, grandfathering (sharing proportional to current emissions) and a number of equitable rules, i.e. sharing according to historical responsibilities for past emissions. Due to strong free-rider incentives we find only small stable coalitions for all sharing rules examined. We observe that stable coalitions consist of regions with low marginal abatement costs that are attractive partners in any coalition and regions receiving the highest shares of the surplus from cooperation under a particular sharing rule. We find that equitable rules may not be conducive to success: in fact, a grandfathering scheme leads to the most successful coalition in terms of global abatement and global welfare.