By evaluating green process innovation and its innovator’s benefit including short- and long-term dimensions, we first analyzed the relationship between green process innovation and its benefits. Second, we set up a regression model to test the hypotheses using 267 survey data from coal mining firms in China. Finally, we verified the positive relationship between green process innovation and its long-term benefit, and the non-significant relationship between green process innovation and its short-term benefit, and the mediating effect played by firm image in the long run.

Using the panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model accompanied by the system-generalized method of moment (System-GMM) approach, this paper investigates the dynamic causality between participation in global value chains (GVCs), renewable energy consumption and carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions throughout 1990–2015 for 172 countries. The results show that participation in GVCs negatively causes renewable energy consumption except for the Middle East and North America (MENA) and sub-Saharan Africa. Second, except for the Asia–Pacific region and globally, participation in GVCs has no causal impact on CO₂ emissions, and participation in GVCs has a positive effect on CO₂ emissions in the Asia–Pacific region and globally. Third, except for globally and sub-Saharan Africa, CO₂ emissions have no causal impact on participation in GVCs; however, CO₂ emissions hurt participation in GVCs globally and in the sub-Saharan African region. Forth, renewable energy consumption positively causes participation in GVCs in MENA, while renewable energy consumption does not cause participation in GVCs globally and in other regions. Fifth, there is no causality between CO₂ emissions and renewable energy consumption both at the global and regional levels. Several policy implications are proposed and discussed for promoting participation in GVCs and improving the environment.

By using a linear feedback control technique, we propose a chaos synchronization scheme for nonlinear fractional discrete dynamical systems. Then, we construct a novel 1-D fractional discrete income change system and a kind of novel 3-D fractional discrete system. By means of the stability principles of Caputo-like fractional discrete systems, we lastly design a controller to achieve chaos synchronization, and present some numerical simulations to illustrate and validate the synchronization scheme.

With the year-on-year growth of e-commerce transactions and the increasing popularity of the concept of ecological civilization, the waste and recycling of express packages have aroused widespread discussion and attention. On the issue of express package recycling, how consumers, e-commerce enterprises, and e-commerce platforms choose their own strategies, how to better promote the recycling of express packages, and what is the effect mechanism of government subsidies on different players. These are the questions that this article wants to answer. Since this article involves many stakeholders, in order to better identify the strategic choice and evolution of different entities and to better study the influence of government subsidies on the strategic choice of game players, this article uses two triparty evolutionary game models. The results show that without subsidies, changes in the rate of return and the initial probability will affect the evolution of the equilibrium strategy, while the synergistic benefits will have a corrective effect in some cases; when government subsidies are included and the probability of the three parties choosing “green strategies” is relatively low, subsidies should be paid to e-commerce companies mainly; lower subsidies can only provide incentives for e-commerce platforms. This article can provide certain references and value for government policymakers.

Excessive growth or improper disposal of construction waste can lead to negative consequences such as environmental destruction and waste of resources. The policy practice of construction waste reduction and resource utilization is facing challenging issues. Construction enterprises (also constructors of construction waste) and building material manufacturers (also recyclers of construction waste) play significant roles in the system of construction waste recycling and resource utilization. However, they are often absent or out of position in most cases. Therefore, this study constructs an evolutionary game model and conducts numerical simulation analysis, aiming to clarify the interactive relationship between their interests and government policy implementation, promote the formation of a cooperative system for construction waste management, and facilitate the achievement of ultimate governance objectives. The research results show that: (1) Current collaboration in construction waste management has fallen into a dilemma of relying solely on government efforts, resulting in inefficient or ineffective policy implementation. (2) The government can change the current situation and achieve better policy outcomes by taking measures such as increasing the income of recycled construction waste products, increasing fines for violations, and lowering industry entry barriers. (3) Different optimization measures vary in the speed at which they promote the evolutionary game system to evolve into a stable and ideal strategic combination. In comparison, increasing the market price of recycled products and increasing their sales volume are more effective optimization strategies. The process and conclusions of this study provide valuable reference and inspiration for the government to formulate construction waste management policies and optimize their policy implementation plans.