As an emerging training model with neural networks, federated learning has received widespread attention due to its ability of updating parameters without collecting users’ raw data. However, since adversaries can track and derive participants’ privacy from the shared gradients, federated learning is still exposed to various security and privacy threats. In this paper, we consider two major issues in the training process over Deep Neural Networks (DNNs): (1) How to protect uses’r privacy (i.e., local gradients) in the training process. (2) How to verify the integrity (or correctness) of the aggregated results returned from the server. To solve the above problems, several approaches focusing on secure or privacy-preserving federated learning have been proposed and applied in diverse scenarios. However, it is still an open problem enabling clients to verify whether the cloud server is operating correctly, while guaranteeing user’s privacy in training process. In this paper, we propose VerifyNet, the first privacy-preserving and verifiable federated learning framework. In specific, we first propose a double-masking protocol to guarantee the confidentiality of users’ local gradients during the federated learning. Then, the cloud server is required to provide the Proof about the correctness of its aggregated results to each user. We claim that it is impossible that an adversary can deceive users by forging Proof, unless it can solve the NP-hard problem adopted in our model. In addition, VerifyNet is also supportive for users dropping out during the training process. Extensive experiments conducted on real-world data also demonstrate the practical performance of our proposed scheme.

By leveraging deep learning-based technologies, industrial artificial intelligence (IAI) has been applied to solve various industrial challenging problems in Industry 4.0. However, for privacy reasons, traditional centralized training may be unsuitable for sensitive data-driven industrial scenarios, such as healthcare and autopilot. Recently, federated learning (FL) has received widespread attention since it enables participants to collaboratively learn a shared model without revealing their local data. However, studies have shown that, by exploiting the shared parameters adversaries can still compromise industrial applications such as auto-driving navigation systems, medical data in wearable devices and industrial robots' decision-making. To solve this problem, we propose an efficient and Privacy-Enhanced Federated Learning (PEFL) scheme for IAI. Compared with existing solutions, PEFL is non-interactive, and can prevent private data from being leaked even if multiple entities collude with each other. Moreover, extensive experiments with real-world data demonstrate the superiority of PEFL in terms of accuracy and efficiency.

Federated learning (FL), as a distributed machine learning setting, has received considerable attention in recent years. To alleviate privacy concerns, FL essentially promises that multiple parties jointly train the model by exchanging gradients rather than raw data. However, intrinsic privacy issue still exists in FL, e.g., user's training samples could be revealed by solely inferring gradients. Moreover, the emerging poisoning attack also poses a crucial security threat to FL. In particular, due to the distributed nature of FL, malicious users may submit crafted gradients during the training process to undermine the integrity and availability of the model. Furthermore, there exists a contradiction in simultaneously addressing two issues, that is, privacy-preserving FL solutions are dedicated to ensuring gradients indistinguishability, whereas the defenses against poisoning attacks tend to remove outliers based on their similarity. To solve such a dilemma, in this paper, we aim to build a bridge between the two issues. Specifically, we present a privacy-enhanced FL (PEFL) framework that adopts homomorphic encryption as the underlying technology and provides the server with a channel to punish poisoners via the effective gradient data extraction of the logarithmic function. To the best of our knowledge, the PEFL is the first effort to efficiently detect the poisoning behaviors in FL under ciphertext. Detailed theoretical analyses illustrate the security and convergence properties of the scheme. Moreover, the experiments conducted on real-world datasets show that the PEFL can effectively defend against label-flipping and backdoor attacks, two representative poisoning attacks in FL.

Federated learning enables clients to train a machine learning model jointly without sharing their local data. However, due to the centrality of federated learning framework and the untrustworthiness of clients, traditional federated learning solutions are vulnerable to poisoning attacks from malicious clients and servers. In this paper, we aim to mitigate the impact of the central server and malicious clients by designing a Privacy-preserving Byzantine-robust Federated Learning (PBFL) scheme based on blockchain. Specifically, we use cosine similarity to judge the malicious gradients uploaded by malicious clients. Then, we adopt fully homomorphic encryption to provide secure aggregation. Finally, we use blockchain system to facilitate transparent processes and implementation of regulations. Our formal analysis proves that our scheme achieves convergence and provides privacy protection. Our extensive experiments on different datasets demonstrate that our scheme is robust and efficient. Even if the root dataset is small, our scheme can achieve the same efficiency as FedSGD.

In this paper, we analyze the inherent characteristic of electronic medical records (EMRs) from actual electronic health (eHealth) systems, where we found that (1) multiple patients would generate large amounts of duplicate EMRs and (2) cross-patient duplicate EMRs would be generated numerously only in the case that the patients consult doctors in the same department. We then propose the first efficient and secure encrypted EMRs deduplication scheme for cloud-assisted eHealth systems (HealthDep). With the integration of our analysis results, HealthDep allows the cloud server to efficiently perform the EMRs deduplication, and enables the cloud server to reduce storage costs by more than 65% while ensuring the confidentiality of EMRs. Security analysis shows that HealthDep is more secure than the Marforio et al's scheme (NDSS 2014) and Bellare et al's scheme (USENIX Security 2013). Algorithm implementation and performance analysis demonstrate the feasibility and high efficiency of HealthDep.

As a basic query function, range query has been exploited in many scenarios such as SQL retrieves, location-based services, and computational geometry. Meanwhile, with explosive growth of data volume, users are increasingly inclining to store data on the cloud for saving local storage and computational cost. However, a long-standing problem is that the user's data may be completely revealed to the cloud server because it has full data access right. To cope with this problem, a frequently-used method is to encrypt raw data before outsourcing them, but the availability and operability of data will be reduced significantly. In this paper, we propose an efficient and geometric range query scheme (EGRQ) supporting searching and data access control over encrypted spatial data. We employ secure KNN computation, polynomial fitting technique, and order-preserving encryption to achieve secure, efficient, and accurate geometric range query over cloud data. Then, we propose a novel spatial data access control strategy to refine user's rights in our EGRQ. To improve the efficiency, R-tree is adopted to reduce the searching space and matching times in whole search process. Finally, we theoretically prove the security of our proposed scheme in terms of confidentiality of spatial data, privacy protection of index and trapdoor, and the unlinkability of trapdoors. In addition, extensive experiments demonstrate the high efficiency of our proposed model compared with existing schemes.