In this article we engage in an extended critique of the thesis that the illegal conduct of corporations necessarily calls for different forms of regulation than other kinds of law-breaking. The proponents of that view argue that the unique nature of such illegalities is one reason why they necessitate a particular type of enforcement attitude or response. They advocate a strategy that produces compliance through persuasion rather than through the threat of sanctions. Another reason advanced is that corporations are not, as many would have it, ‘amoral calculators’, but rather ‘political citizens’ who may indeed sometimes err but are more prone to organizational incompetence than deliberate wrongdoing. Thus they need advice rather than chastisement: regulatory agencies should act as consultants rather than policemen. We will take each element of this argument in turn and show that it is neither logically nor empirically persuasive. We will then turn to the issue of how to make corporate regulation more effective and show that this requires a consideration of both the most suitable strategies for the enforcement agencies to adopt and the most appropriate legal framework for determining the criminal responsibility of these corporations.
This paper documents the vulnerability of the UK workplace safety regime to ‘regulatory degradation’. Following a brief overview of this regime, the paper examines the dominant arguments within academic literature on appropriate and feasible regulatory enforcement, arguing that the approaches to regulation thereby advocated have been easily degraded as a result of their compatibility with neo-liberal economic strategy. A subsequent analysis of empirical trends within safety enforcement reveals a virtual collapse of formal enforcement, as political and resource pressures have taken their toll on the regulatory authority. Finally, the paper indicates that the increasing impunity with which employers can kill and injure is particularly problematic as we enter sustained economic recession, and underlines the urgent need for regulatory alternatives.
This article begins by setting out an analysis of the process of conventionalizing corporate crime that arises from the symbiotic relationship between states and corporations. Noting briefly the empirical characteristics of four broad categories of corporate crime and harm, the article then turns to explore the role of the state in its production and reproduction. We then problematize the role of the state in the reproduction of corporate crime at the level of the global economy, through a discussion of the “crimes of globalization” and “ecocide,” warning of the tendency in the research literature to oversimplify the role of states and of international organizations. The article finishes by arguing that, as critical academics, it is our role to ensure that corporate crime is never normalized nor fully conventionalized in advanced capitalist societies.