The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the influence of corporate governance characteristics and corporate ownership concentrations on the financial performance of Chinese companies. This is based on analysis of a panel data set covering the years 2001 to 2005. The characteristics considered are the ratios of independent directors and professional supervisors on the companies' two boards, and the level of concentration in and type of ownership of the companies. Our chosen performance metric is Tobin's Q. We find that ownership concentration in general is a significant factor in determining firm performance. The degree of board independence is significant, but it only appears to have a positive impact on performance in larger companies. The expertise of the supervisory board is not a significant determinant of corporate financial performance in China. Our findings support a continued focus on making improvements to the operation and effectiveness of China's institutions of corporate governance.
1 December 2020 in Research in International Business and Finance
China’s historical mixed-ownership reform (the Reform) has prioritized enhancing the efficiency and financial performance of its large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through introduction of partial private-sector equity ownership. However, the presence of a significant gap between China’s private enterprises’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and those of its SOEs suggests potential for Reform-related ownership changes to negatively impact economy-wide CSR performance. We therefore examine the Reform’s impact on private acquirer firms’ CSR practices. We use a proprietary data set of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, covering the 2011–2015 period. Our findings identify that private firms can enhance their economic and political status through acquiring equity in state-controlled or SOEs and, following this, improve their CSR practices. Our findings have policy implications in the context of the world’s largest emerging market and, more generally, for SOE ownership reform in emerging and transition economies.
We examine the impact of political connections on firm performance, financial distress, and its resolution in China, a country where government influence over stock markets has been demonstrated to be considerable. Our findings suggest that over 1999 to 2015, although political connections had limited impact on the emergence of financial distress, such connections assisted distressed firms in gaining increments to debt financing and contributed to a higher likelihood of recovery. This indicates that Chinese authorities follow market economy principles, and only intervene in firms’ operations after they fall into financial distress. In addition, central and local government political connections have different impacts on distress recovery. We conduct additional analyses on differences in distress outcomes for various ownership (State-owned enterprises, SOEs, and non–SOEs) and sample sub-periods (1999–2007 and 2008–2015). Our results are robust to potential endogeneity issues and to alternative measures of financial distress.