This article provides a tool for analyzing mechanisms that aim to achieve resilience against stealthy, or undetectable, attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We consider attackers who are able to corrupt all of the inputs and outputs of the system. To counter such attackers, a response scheme must be implemented that keeps the attacker from corrupting the inputs and outputs of the system for certain periods of time. To aid in the design of such a response scheme, our tool provides sufficient lengths for these periods of time in order to ensure safety with a particular probability. We provide an upper bound on how long the system can remain under stealthy attack before the safety constraints are violated. Furthermore, we show how a detector limits the set of biases an attacker can exert on the system while still remaining stealthy, aiding a system operator in the design of the detector. Our contributions are demonstrated with an illustrative example.
14 December 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Cyber-physical systems are prevalent in many critical infrastructures and are vulnerable to a variety of attacks from the network. Decentralized control systems are particularly vulnerable since they rely heavily on network communication to achieve their goals. To address network vulnerabilities, we present an event-triggered network connection and communication protocol that minimizes the amount of time agents are connected to the network, reducing the window of opportunity for attacks. This mechanism is a function of only local information and ensures stability for the overall system in attack-free scenarios. Our approach distinguishes itself from current decentralized event-triggered control strategies by considering an undirected and connected communication graph and by not assuming that agents are always connected to the network to receive critical information from other agents. An algorithm describing this network connection and communication protocol is provided, and our approach is illustrated via simulation.
Decentralized control systems are widely used in a number of situations and applications. In order for these systems to function properly and achieve their desired goals, information must be propagated between agents, which requires connecting to a network. To reduce vulnerabilities to attacks that may be carried out through the network, we design an event-triggered mechanism for network connection and communication that minimizes the amount of time agents must be connected to the network, in turn decreasing communication costs. This mechanism is a function of only local information and ensures stability for the overall system in attack-free scenarios. Our approach distinguishes itself from current decentralized event-triggered control strategies by including measurements in the system model, by not needing to implement any reachability analysis, and by considering scenarios where agents are not always connected to the network to receive critical information from other agents. Algorithms describing these network connection and communication protocols are provided, and our approach is illustrated via simulation.
This article considers the design and analysis of multiple moving target defenses for recognizing and isolating attacks on cyber-physical systems. We consider attackers who perform integrity attacks on a set of sensors and actuators in a control system. In such cases, a model aware adversary can carefully design attack vectors to bypass bad data detection and identification filters while causing damage to the control system. To counter such an attacker, we propose the moving target defense which introduces stochastic, time-varying parameters in the control system. The underlying random dynamics of the system limit an attacker's model knowledge and inhibits his/her ability to construct stealthy attack sequences. Moreover, the time-varying nature of the dynamics thwarts adaptive adversaries. We explore three main designs. First, we consider a hybrid system where parameters within the existing plant are switched among multiple modes. We demonstrate how such an approach can enable both the detection and identification of malicious nodes. Next, we investigate the addition of an extended system with dynamics that are coupled to the original plant but do not affect system performance. An attack on the original system will affect the authenticating subsystem and in turn be revealed by a set of sensors measuring the extended plant. Lastly, we propose the use of sensor nonlinearities to enhance the effectiveness of the moving target defense. The nonlinear dynamics act to conceal normal operational behavior from an attacker who has tampered with the system state, further hindering an attacker's ability to glean information about the time-varying dynamics. In all cases mechanisms for analysis and design are proposed. Finally, we analyze attack detectability for each moving target defense by investigating expected lower bounds on the detection statistic. Our contributions are tested via simulation.