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Previous empirical evidence on municipal efficiency mostly uses cross-sectional data which makes it impossible to separate unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency. Furthermore, they also typically use a two-stage approach which has been widely criticized as the assumptions in the first stage are violated in the second stage, generating biased results. We contribute to the literature by putting forward a one stage approach with parametric models and panel data to estimate municipal efficiency of 324 Chilean municipalities for the period 2008–2018. We take into account observed and unobserved heterogeneity, incorporating them both into the frontier and jointly estimating efficiency of all the municipalities in the sample. Our results suggest that Chilean municipalities have a relevant degree of inefficiency as they could achieve the same provision of services with 53% −61% less resources, depending on the specification, and that there is large heterogeneity in their level of efficiency. Finally, we also find that municipalities with a high dependency on the Municipal Common Fund are less efficient supporting the notion of local governments fiscal laziness present in the literature …
Francisca Pacheco; Rafael Sánchez; Mauricio G. Villena. Estimating local government efficiency using a panel data parametric approach: the case of Chilean municipalities. Applied Economics 2020, 53, 292 -314.
AMA StyleFrancisca Pacheco, Rafael Sánchez, Mauricio G. Villena. Estimating local government efficiency using a panel data parametric approach: the case of Chilean municipalities. Applied Economics. 2020; 53 (3):292-314.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFrancisca Pacheco; Rafael Sánchez; Mauricio G. Villena. 2020. "Estimating local government efficiency using a panel data parametric approach: the case of Chilean municipalities." Applied Economics 53, no. 3: 292-314.
Este trabajo presenta un marco de análisis de la sostenibilidad fiscal para la economía chilena. Primero, se aborda el cálculo ex post de indicadores de vulnerabilidad y sostenibilidad fiscal, sobre la base de la estimación de un nivel de deuda sostenible, considerando un estado estacionario de las finanzas públicas. Segundo, se desarrolla un modelo dinámico de sostenibilidad fiscal. En este estudio se presenta un modelo ad hoc para las finanzas públicas chilenas, siendo el primero en incorporar la dinámica del Fondo de Reserva de Pensiones (FRP), con sus reglas de acumulación y desembolso, y la política de balance cíclicamente ajustado. Finalmente, se simula la senda de deuda neta del gobierno central presupuestario de Chile hacia 2025, utilizando las proyecciones realizadas en el Informe de Finanzas Públicas 2018, evaluando un escenario macroeconómico de tendencia y otro adverso, todo esto en el contexto de la regla de balance cíclicamente ajustado.
Mauricio Villena; Cristóbal Gamboni; Andrés Tomaselli. La sostenibilidad fiscal y la política de balance cíclicamente ajustado: Metodología y análisis para Chile. Revista de la CEPAL 2018, 2018, 223 -253.
AMA StyleMauricio Villena, Cristóbal Gamboni, Andrés Tomaselli. La sostenibilidad fiscal y la política de balance cíclicamente ajustado: Metodología y análisis para Chile. Revista de la CEPAL. 2018; 2018 (124):223-253.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMauricio Villena; Cristóbal Gamboni; Andrés Tomaselli. 2018. "La sostenibilidad fiscal y la política de balance cíclicamente ajustado: Metodología y análisis para Chile." Revista de la CEPAL 2018, no. 124: 223-253.
This paper employs an indirect approach to formally examine the evolutionary stability of interdependent preferences when players randomly engage in pairwise interactions. Following the model specification for altruism and spitefulness in experiments proposed by Levine (1998), we also explore the stability of reciprocity and reciprocal preferences. In particular, we study how individuals equipped with intrinsic preferences such as altruism, selfishness or spitefulness adjust their behavior depending on who they interact with. The key aspect of our method is that behavioral preferences are choice variables that optimally evolve, accounting for strategic interaction. Our model predicts that in a specific economic framework characterized by negative externalities and strategic substitutes, there is a continuum of evolutionary stable interdependent preference profiles: At least one player behaves spitefully, and at most one acts selfishly. The emergence of altruism as an evolutionarily stable preference crucially depends on how large the support for preferences is. When players have reciprocal preferences, altruism might arise even in meetings where one player is intrinsically spiteful, but not necessarily from the intrinsically altruistic player.
José A. Carrasco; Rodrigo Harrison; Mauricio Villena. Interdependent preferences and endogenous reciprocity. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2018, 76, 68 -75.
AMA StyleJosé A. Carrasco, Rodrigo Harrison, Mauricio Villena. Interdependent preferences and endogenous reciprocity. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 2018; 76 ():68-75.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJosé A. Carrasco; Rodrigo Harrison; Mauricio Villena. 2018. "Interdependent preferences and endogenous reciprocity." Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 76, no. : 68-75.
Thermal energy storage systems (TES) are a key component of concentrated solar power (CSP) plants that generally use a NaNO3/KNO3 mixture also known as solar salt as a thermal storage material. Improvements in TES materials are important to lower CSP costs, increase energy efficiency and competitiveness with other technologies. A novel alternative examined in this paper is the use of salt mixtures with lithium nitrate that help to reduce the salt’s melting point and improve thermal capacity. This in turn allows the volume of materials required to be reduced. Based on data for commercial plants and the expected evolution of the lithium market, the technical and economic prospects for this alternative are evaluated considering recent developments of Lithium Nitrates and the uncertain future prices of lithium. Through a levelized cost of energy (LCOE) analysis it is concluded that some of the mixtures could allow a reduction in the costs of CSP plants, improving their competitiveness.
Macarena Montané; Gustavo Cáceres; Mauricio Villena; Raúl O’Ryan. Techno-Economic Forecasts of Lithium Nitrates for Thermal Storage Systems. Sustainability 2017, 9, 810 .
AMA StyleMacarena Montané, Gustavo Cáceres, Mauricio Villena, Raúl O’Ryan. Techno-Economic Forecasts of Lithium Nitrates for Thermal Storage Systems. Sustainability. 2017; 9 (5):810.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMacarena Montané; Gustavo Cáceres; Mauricio Villena; Raúl O’Ryan. 2017. "Techno-Economic Forecasts of Lithium Nitrates for Thermal Storage Systems." Sustainability 9, no. 5: 810.
Eugenio Rojas; Rafael Sánchez; Mauricio Villena. Credit constraints in higher education in a context of unobserved heterogeneity. Economics of Education Review 2016, 52, 225 -250.
AMA StyleEugenio Rojas, Rafael Sánchez, Mauricio Villena. Credit constraints in higher education in a context of unobserved heterogeneity. Economics of Education Review. 2016; 52 ():225-250.
Chicago/Turabian StyleEugenio Rojas; Rafael Sánchez; Mauricio Villena. 2016. "Credit constraints in higher education in a context of unobserved heterogeneity." Economics of Education Review 52, no. : 225-250.
Eugenio Rojas; Rafael Sánchez; Mauricio Villena. The Unintended Consequences of Childcare Regulation: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design. Journal of Applied Economics 2016, 19, 1 -39.
AMA StyleEugenio Rojas, Rafael Sánchez, Mauricio Villena. The Unintended Consequences of Childcare Regulation: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design. Journal of Applied Economics. 2016; 19 (1):1-39.
Chicago/Turabian StyleEugenio Rojas; Rafael Sánchez; Mauricio Villena. 2016. "The Unintended Consequences of Childcare Regulation: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design." Journal of Applied Economics 19, no. 1: 1-39.
Iván M Lucich; Mauricio Villena; María José Quinteros. Transportation costs, agricultural expansion and tropical deforestation: Theory and evidence from Peru. Ciencia e investigación agraria 2015, 42, 3 -3.
AMA StyleIván M Lucich, Mauricio Villena, María José Quinteros. Transportation costs, agricultural expansion and tropical deforestation: Theory and evidence from Peru. Ciencia e investigación agraria. 2015; 42 (2):3-3.
Chicago/Turabian StyleIván M Lucich; Mauricio Villena; María José Quinteros. 2015. "Transportation costs, agricultural expansion and tropical deforestation: Theory and evidence from Peru." Ciencia e investigación agraria 42, no. 2: 3-3.
Artículo de publicación ISIInnovation in LatinAmerica is a challenge for achieving development. Several Latin American countries and businesses are attempting to increase innov ation and entrepreneurship but they face substantial challenges and difficulties. Institutional, governmental and business policies and practices need to be enhanced in order to increase such innovation. Increasing business research in Latin America and university-business partnerships is probably key in such endeavor. This special issue provides some evidence regarding these challenges at the company level, industry level, and country level. This issue also includes three cases showing Latin American company experiences with financial, marketing and new product innovations and market changes
Sergio Olavarrieta; Mauricio Villena. Innovation and business research in Latin America: An overview. Journal of Business Research 2014, 67, 489 -497.
AMA StyleSergio Olavarrieta, Mauricio Villena. Innovation and business research in Latin America: An overview. Journal of Business Research. 2014; 67 (4):489-497.
Chicago/Turabian StyleSergio Olavarrieta; Mauricio Villena. 2014. "Innovation and business research in Latin America: An overview." Journal of Business Research 67, no. 4: 489-497.
This paper analyzes the relationship between rural poverty and forestland management in the context of charcoal production under slash and burn. An optimal control model determines how a representative household makes decisions on the allocation of labor and forest areas to exploit, which in turn affects the renewable resource base available to the community. The proposed optimal control model for charcoal production is built upon the agricultural model of slash and burn of Pascual and Barbier (2007). This theoretical model is calibrated with data from the community of Chunkanán, Campeche, Mexico. The simulation and comparison of the traditional forestry slash and burn management with the Forest Management Program for the Exploitation of Timber Resources (FMPETR), put forward by the regulatory authority as a policy of use and conservation of forest resources, showed that the former, and not the latter, is sustainable from an ecological point of view and efficient from an economic point of view, implying that households allocate an optimal amount of labor and forest biomass. This result suggests that the FMPETR is a suboptimal policy, showing that there is room for improvement in terms of the design and implementation of policies aimed at providing economic and social incentives leading to the sustainable management of natural resources.
Fernando Arrocha; Mauricio G Villena. Applying a bioeconomic optimal control model to charcoal production: the case of slash-and-burn agriculture in Mexico. Ciencia e investigación agraria 2012, 39, 489 -504.
AMA StyleFernando Arrocha, Mauricio G Villena. Applying a bioeconomic optimal control model to charcoal production: the case of slash-and-burn agriculture in Mexico. Ciencia e investigación agraria. 2012; 39 (3):489-504.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFernando Arrocha; Mauricio G Villena. 2012. "Applying a bioeconomic optimal control model to charcoal production: the case of slash-and-burn agriculture in Mexico." Ciencia e investigación agraria 39, no. 3: 489-504.
Mauricio Villena; Franco Zecchetto. Subject-specific performance information can worsen the tragedy of the commons: Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology 2011, 32, 330 -347.
AMA StyleMauricio Villena, Franco Zecchetto. Subject-specific performance information can worsen the tragedy of the commons: Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology. 2011; 32 (3):330-347.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMauricio Villena; Franco Zecchetto. 2011. "Subject-specific performance information can worsen the tragedy of the commons: Experimental evidence." Journal of Economic Psychology 32, no. 3: 330-347.
Carlos A. Chávez; Mauricio Villena; John K. Stranlund. The Choice of Policy Instruments to Control Pollution Under Costly Enforcement and Incomplete Information. Journal of Applied Economics 2009, 12, 207 -227.
AMA StyleCarlos A. Chávez, Mauricio Villena, John K. Stranlund. The Choice of Policy Instruments to Control Pollution Under Costly Enforcement and Incomplete Information. Journal of Applied Economics. 2009; 12 (2):207-227.
Chicago/Turabian StyleCarlos A. Chávez; Mauricio Villena; John K. Stranlund. 2009. "The Choice of Policy Instruments to Control Pollution Under Costly Enforcement and Incomplete Information." Journal of Applied Economics 12, no. 2: 207-227.
We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs, enforcement costs, and pollution damage. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm, except possibly when a regulator can base the probabilities of detecting individual violations on observable correlates of violators’ actual emissions. Moreover, optimality requires discriminatory taxes, except when a regulator is unable to use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about the variation in firms’ abatement costs or monitoring costs.
John K. Stranlund; Carlos A. Chávez; Mauricio Villena. The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2009, 58, 183 -191.
AMA StyleJohn K. Stranlund, Carlos A. Chávez, Mauricio Villena. The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2009; 58 (2):183-191.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJohn K. Stranlund; Carlos A. Chávez; Mauricio Villena. 2009. "The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 58, no. 2: 183-191.
Mauricio Villena; Marcelo J. Villena. Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian? Journal of Economic Issues 2004, 38, 585 -610.
AMA StyleMauricio Villena, Marcelo J. Villena. Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian? Journal of Economic Issues. 2004; 38 (3):585-610.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMauricio Villena; Marcelo J. Villena. 2004. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?" Journal of Economic Issues 38, no. 3: 585-610.