A random intersection graph is constructed by assigning independently to each vertex a subset of a given set and drawing an edge between two vertices if and only if their respective subsets intersect. In this article a model is developed in which each vertex is given a random weight and vertices with larger weights are more likely to be assigned large subsets. The distribution of the degree of a given vertex is characterized and is shown to depend on the weight of the vertex. In particular, if the weight distribution is a power law, the degree distribution will be as well. Furthermore, an asymptotic expression for the clustering in the graph is derived. By tuning the parameters of the model, it is possible to generate a graph with arbitrary clustering, expected degree, and—in the power-law case—tail exponent.
We used a low-temperature scanning tunneling microscope to study Zn- and Cd-doping atoms near the (110)-cleavage surfaces of GaAs and InP at 4.2 K. The filled-state images showed centro-symmetric elevations while the empty-state images showed circular depressions. We attribute these features to the influence of the Coulomb potential of the ionized doping atoms on the number of states available for tunneling. In a few empty-state images of the GaAs(110) surface, the depressions were surrounded by maxima, which are probably direct observations of Friedel oscillations. For the InP(110) surface, all depressions were surrounded by noncentrosymmetric maxima. Upon moving the tip Fermi level to the bottom of the conduction band, we observed that the depressions turned into elevations with a triangular shape for both the GaAs(110) and the InP(110) surface. This shape was independent of the depth of the dopants, and the chemical nature of the dopants (Zn or Cd) did not influence the triangular shape either. The orientation of these triangular features was the same for all observed doping atoms and was geometrically determined with respect to the host lattice. Furthermore, we determined the location of a triangular feature with respect to a doping atom. The features were only visible when tunneling to the impurity band suggesting that the features are a direct image of the acceptor state although the origin of the triangular shape is not clear at present.
Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that no refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refinements do exist if we relax the assumption that all players are unlimited in their reasoning ability. In particular, for a class of models, every strict Bayesian–Nash equilibrium is robust. In these environments, a researcher interested in making sharp predictions can use refinements to select among the strict equilibria of the game, and these predictions will be robust.
1 November 2005 in International Journal of Game Theory