Due to recent cryptanalytical breakthroughs, the multivariate signature schemes that seemed to be most promising in the past years are no longer in the focus of the research community. Hence, the cryptographically mature UOV scheme is of great interest again. Since it has not been part of the NIST process for standardizing post-quantum cryptography so far, it has not been studied intensively for its physical security.In this work, we present a side-channel attack on the latest implementation of UOV. In the first part of the attack, a single side-channel trace of the signing process is used to learn all vinegar variables used in the computation. Then, we employ a combination of the Kipnis-Shamir attack and the reconciliation attack to reveal the complete secret key. Our attack, unlike previous work, targets the inversion of the central map and not the subsequent linear transformation. It further does not require the attacker to control the message to be signed.We have verified the practicality of our attack on a ChipWhisperer-Lite board with a 32-bit STM32F3 ARM Cortex-M4 target mounted on a CW308 UFO board. We publicly provide the code and both reference and target traces. Additionally, we discuss several countermeasures that can at least make our attack less efficient.
31 August 2023 in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
In LWE-based KEMs, observed decryption errors leak information about the secret key in the form of equations or inequalities. Several practical fault attacks have already exploited such leakage by either directly applying a fault or enabling a chosen-ciphertext attack using a fault. When the leaked information is in the form of inequalities, the recovery of the secret key is not trivial. Recent methods use either statistical or algebraic methods (but not both), with some being able to handle incorrect information. Having in mind that integration of the side-channel information is a crucial part of several classes of implementation attacks on LWEbased schemes, it is an important question whether statistically processed information can be successfully integrated in lattice reduction algorithms.We answer this question positively by proposing an error-tolerant combination of statistical and algebraic methods that make use of the advantages of both approaches. The combination enables us to improve upon existing methods – we use both fewer inequalities and are more resistant to errors. We further provide precise security estimates based on the number of available inequalities.Our recovery method applies to several types of implementation attacks in which decryption errors are used in a chosen-ciphertext attack. We practically demonstrate the improved performance of our approach in a key-recovery attack against Kyber with fault-induced decryption errors.
In this paper, we analyze the hardness of the Matrix Code Equivalence () problem for matrix codes endowed with the rank metric, and provide the first algorithms for solving it. We do this by making a connection to another well-known equivalence problem from multivariate cryptography—the Isomorphism of Polynomials (). Under mild assumptions, we give tight reductions from to the homogenous version of the Quadratic Maps Linear Equivalence () problem, and vice versa. Furthermore, we present reductions to and from similar problems in the sum-rank metric, showing that is at the core of code equivalence problems. On the practical side, using birthday techniques known for , we present two algorithms: a probabilistic algorithm for running in time $$q^{\frac{2}{3}(n+m)}$$ up to a polynomial factor, and a deterministic algorithm for with roots, running in time $$q^{\min \{m,n,k\}}$$ up to a polynomial factor. Lastly, to confirm these findings, we solve randomly-generated instances of using these two algorithms.