Purpose: This study moves beyond existing research on gender diversity to define a new construct – gender power. The study examines gender power within the top management team (TMT) and its relationship to firm performance and firm risk.Design/methodology/approach: The study utilizes a cross-disciplinary combination of upper echelons theory and finance theory as a framework to further examine the impact of gender power within the TMT and its impact on firm risk and firm performance. Employing data collected for 2,570 American publicly traded small-, medium- and large-cap firms over a 20-year period, panel regression analyses were conducted for measures of firm risk and firm performance, beta and return on assets (ROA), respectively.Findings: This study shows that gender diversity and gender power are two distinct constructs with different effects. The findings from this study suggest that gender power may be a stronger predictor of the relationship between firm performance and firm risk than simply gender diversity alone.Research limitations/implications: This study was conducted based on a sample of publicly traded firms. These relationships may not be generalizable to firms in other contexts. Further, other variables representing firm performance and firm risk may add to this research.Practical implications: Understanding the differences between gender diversity and gender power may allow firms to make more informed decisions when adding female executives to their TMTs.Originality/value: This study proposes an objective representational indicator of structural power to measure the relative power of female executives of public companies that allows the expansion of existing research examining the distinction between gender diversity and gender power and their relationship to firm risk and firm performance.
This paper investigates the motivations behind corporate social responsibility (CSR) by considering the consequences of environmental, social and governance (ESG) failures that CSR is intended to avoid. Using data from 2581 public U.S. firms over 2007–2018, this paper finds that such failures are associated with increased CEO turnover. This relationship is driven primarily by CEOs with longer tenures and by environmental issues. These negative events are also found to be associated with declines in the firm’s sales growth, employment growth and equity returns. CSR activities that reduce the incidence of such events therefore benefit both the CEO and the shareholder. Interestingly, replacing the CEO does not mitigate the negative impacts of such events on the firm, nor does it reduce the incidence of such events in subsequent years. The decision to remove the CEO following such failures appears costly to both the CEO and the firm’s shareholders.
This paper considers the impact of the composition of the top management team on the credit default risk of the firm. Finance theory suggests that shareholders prefer higher levels of risk than the risk-averse executives managing the firm. Increasing the influence of female executives may reduce credit default risk, as female executives have been shown to be associated with lower firm risk. Alternatively, as diversity has been shown to improve the quality of group decision-making, a higher but optimal credit default risk may result. This paper uses a matched sample of 6,652 firm-year observations of publicly traded American firms over the period 2010–2020 to investigate the relationship between gender power within the top management team and credit default risk as measured by the Altman Z-score. This paper finds a convex relationship between the Altman Z-score and the influence of female executives. In other words, top management teams where power is shared between female and male executives accept higher levels of credit default risk than teams dominated by just female (or just male) executives. However, this paper also finds that an excessively high credit risk is negatively associated with the influence of female executives.
Purpose: This study explores the relationship between US public firms’ dividend policies and CEO selection. Specifically, we examine the association between successor CEOs’ prior employment and firms’ payout policies around CEO turnover events.Design/methodology/approach: Using Execucomp, we identify a sample of 1,021 S&P 1500 firms with CEO turnover events occurring from 2010 to 2016. We categorize successor CEOs by their prior position as a public insider (hired internally from the public firm), public outsider (hired from a different public firm) or private outsider (hired from a private firm). We investigate dividend policies around CEO turnovers using differences-in-means and probit analyses.Findings: Firms that hired private CEOs were 11.0% less likely to have paid a dividend in the year prior to the CEO turnover. However, those firms that had paid a dividend in the prior year were 5.4% more likely to subsequently drop their dividend. This finding supports a distinct effect that is related to the successor CEOs’ prior experience managing private firms, rather than an “outsider” effect: payout policies of firms that hired public outsiders were no different from those that hired public insiders.Originality/value: We show that public firms that hire private CEOs tend to have dividend policies similar to those of private firms. This evidence suggests that human capital developed at private firms is applied when CEOs transfer to public firms. We show that outsiders from public firms behave differently from outsiders from private firms, and we are the first to measure the frequency of each kind of CEO successor: public insiders, public outsiders and private outsiders. These findings suggest a method to indirectly study private firms using more readily available data from public firms led by private CEOs.