In Turkey, monetary policy responds to cost shocks rather than the inflation gap and output gap. To clarify this policy, we estimate the linear and non-linear Taylor rule using the Thresold GMM for 2006:01-2020:07. The linear model estimates that the policy rate responds significantly to the inflation gap and the real effective exchange rate. The non-linear model captures that monetary policy differs in regimes where imported goods and input prices are set as high and low. In a high price regime, monetary policy also reacts to cost-push shocks. The response of monetary policy to the exchange rate implicitly leads to "a leaning against the wind".
3 December 2018 in Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management
With this paper the author forecasts the out-of-sample volatility of gold price changes in Turkey. Looking at the both the symmetric and the asymmetric evaluation criteria, GJR-GARCH model is the best fitted model for forecasting gold price volatility in Turkey. The GJR-GARCH model findings reveal a negative shock asymmetry for gold prices. Thus, it shows that positive news in the market affects the volatility of gold prices in the next period more than negative news.
The problem of coordination between policymakers seems to have created fundamental problems related to economic and social costs, targeted inflation, potential growth, and a high budget deficit. To resolve these problems in this framework, it is important to see the results of the interaction between policymakers and to propose an optimal policy strategy. In this study, the interactions between monetary and fiscal policymakers are examined game theoretically within the framework of the New Keynesian model. The strategic interaction between these policymakers is assessed using the DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) model for a small open economy. From this point of view, the interaction between policymakers is assessed within the framework of hypothetical scenarios. The optimal monetary and fiscal policies for a small open economy are derived from the leader-follower mechanism solution known as the Stackelberg solution. Optimal Stackelberg policy rules derived for a small open economy contribute to the literature of economics. The performance of the game theoretically derived optimal policy rules is evaluated through dynamic simulation within the framework of counterfactual experiments. The parameters developed for the model are calibrated for the Turkish economy. Dynamic simulation of the models, the impulse response functions, and the social loss analysis shows that the optimal policy mix for the Turkish economy is when the monetary policymaker is the leader, and the fiscal policymaker is the follower.
In this study, we present about the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy makers in the Turkish economy since the 2001 crisis. This interaction is evaluated by a theoretical perspective of the game. The data show that there is a conflict between the monetary and fiscal policy makers in the Turkish economy, especially in some periods. The coordination problem created by this conflict is affecting social welfare negatively. Therefore, we argue that during these periods, there is a state of "Prisoners' Dilemma" among policy makers.