The application of big data targeted advertising in the green supply chain makes the green marketing of products more accurate and effective. This paper applies game theory to study the decisions and coordination issues of a green supply chain in which the online retailer conducts big data targeted advertising. A centralized model and two Stackelberg game models (an online-retailer-led decentralized model and a manufacturer-led decentralized model) were constructed and solved. The zero wholesale price-side-payment contract and greedy wholesale price-side-payment contract were introduced into the green supply chain for coordination. The study found that: (1) the increase in demand attenuation coefficient, green sensitivity coefficient, and big data targeted advertising sensitivity coefficient will be beneficial to the growth of total consumer demand, supply chain profit, and environmental benefit; (2) supply chain coordination is necessary because greenness, demand, supply chain profit, and environmental benefit under the centralized model are higher than those under two decentralized models; (3) two contracts can achieve the coordination of the green supply chain, and the profits of the manufacturer and online retailer under the contract are greater than those under the decentralized model. The results can provide insights for promoting green supply chain operations.

Due to limited guarantees, it is difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to obtain loans from banks. Supply chain accounts-receivable pledge financing (SCARPF) can help in overcoming those financing difficulties. This study developed an evolutionary game model of banks, core enterprises and SMEs in SCARPF, analyzed the evolution path and evolution rules of the model, and performed a numerical simulation. The results indicated that the result of the evolutionary game depends on the initial values of the variables. When certain conditions are met, the system will evolve to (lending, keep the contract). The higher the return rate during either normal production of SMEs, the loan interest rate or supply chain punishment, the more likely it is that banks will lend money and SMEs will keep the contract. However, the bank will only be likely to lend money, enabling SMEs to keep the contract, when the probability of core enterprises and SMEs engaging in joint loan fraud—or the proportion of the benefits that SMEs share when engaging in joint loan fraud—is reduced. The results of this study provide insights for banks, core enterprises, and SMEs in supply chain financing decisions, which is conducive to solving the financing difficulties of SMEs.

The development of a green economy has become a global consensus. More and more manufacturers are greening their production to build green supply chains. At the same time, retailers are employing green marketing efforts for green products. In addition, members who are followers of the green supply chain are prone to fairness-concern behavior. To investigate the impact of fairness concerns on green supply chain decisions, this study develops a two-tier green supply chain in which the manufacturer makes green input and the retailer makes green marketing effort input. The retailer in the follower position of the supply chain has fairness concerns. Stackelberg game models are constructed and compared in three scenarios: one without fairness concerns, one where the manufacturer considers the retailer’s fairness concerns, and one where the manufacturer does not consider the retailer’s fairness concerns. After the manufacturer decides whether to consider the retailer’s fairness concerns, a two-part tariff contract is used to coordinate the green supply chain based on optimal decision-making and profit under a centralized decision-making condition. The study found that: (1) when the manufacturer considers the retailer’s fairness concerns, fairness concerns will negatively impact greenness, green marketing efforts, wholesale price, and retail price. When the manufacturer does not consider the retailer’s fairness concerns, fairness concerns will not impact greenness or wholesale price, but will negatively impact green marketing efforts; (2) the retailer’s fairness concerns have a negative impact on the green supply chain’s profit, and from the supply chain perspective, the retailer should abandon its fairness concerns; (3) it will be more beneficial if the manufacturer can consider the retailer’s fairness concerns; (4) when the manufacturer does not consider the retailer’s fairness concerns, the retailer can make fairness concerns according to the parameter conditions; (5) when a fixed fee meets a certain range, the two-part tariff contract can coordinate the green supply chain when the retailer has fairness concerns. The results will help manufacturers and retailers better understand fairness concerns and provide them with decision-making guidance and coordinated choices.

This study investigates the impacts of fairness concerns on a two-tier green agricultural product supply chain (GAPSC) with an agricultural cooperative making green input and a retailer making fresh-keeping input. Game models are constructed and compared in four scenarios: centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making without fairness concerns, and decentralized decision-making with the retailer considering or not considering the agricultural cooperative's fairness concerns. The results showed that fairness concerns will negatively impact the GAPSC. Agricultural cooperatives can make fairness concerns as appropriate. It is more beneficial for retailers to consider fairness concerns of agricultural cooperatives. The GAPSC operates most efficiently under centralized decision-making.

Purpose: The importance of carbon reduction has become a global consensus, and more and more countries are implementing the cap-and-trade mechanism, including China. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal carbon emission allowances (CEA) purchasing decisions of supply chain members under the cap-and-trade mechanism in China. Design/methodology/approach: An evolutionary game model is established to analyze the CEA purchase strategy choices of suppliers and manufacturers in the supply chain. The influence of the key parameters on the evolutionary game results is analyzed by numerical simulations. Findings: The supply chain system always evolves towards neither supplier nor manufacturer purchasing CEA or both purchasing CEA. Illegal production behavior and excessive CEA costs are key factors that hinder parties from purchasing CEA. High revenue from purchasing CEA for production, high supply chain losses and high governmental penalties can promote parties to purchase CEA. Originality/value: The results help supply chain members make better CEA purchasing decisions and also benefit the development of China’s carbon trading market and environmental protection.