A consolidated approach to the study of the mental representation of word meanings has consisted in contrasting different domains of knowledge, broadly reflecting the abstract-concrete dichotomy. More fine-grained semantic distinctions have emerged in neuropsychological and cognitive neuroscience work, reflecting semantic category specificity, but almost exclusively within the concrete domain. Theoretical advances, particularly within the area of embodied cognition, have more recently put forward the idea that distributed neural representations tied to the kinds of experience maintained with the concepts' referents might distinguish conceptual meanings with a high degree of specificity, including those within the abstract domain. Here we report the results of two psycholinguistic rating studies incorporating such theoretical advances with two main objectives: first, to provide empirical evidence of fine-grained distinctions within both the abstract and the concrete semantic domains with respect to relevant psycholinguistic dimensions; second, to develop a carefully controlled linguistic stimulus set that may be used for auditory as well as visual neuroimaging studies focusing on the parametrization of the semantic space beyond the abstract-concrete dichotomy. Ninety-six participants rated a set of 210 sentences across pre-selected concrete (mouth, hand, or leg action-related) and abstract (mental state-, emotion-, mathematics-related) categories, with respect either to different semantic domain-related scales (rating study 1), or to concreteness, familiarity, and context availability (rating study 2). Inferential statistics and correspondence analyses highlighted distinguishing semantic and psycholinguistic traits for each of the pre-selected categories, indicating that a simple abstract-concrete dichotomy is not sufficient to account for the entire semantic variability within either domains.

Pragmatic and cognitive accounts of figurative language posit a difference between metaphor and metonymy in terms of underlying conceptual operations. Recently, other pragmatic uses of words have been accounted for in the Relevance Theory framework, such as approximation, described in terms of conceptual adjustment that varies in degree and direction with respect to the case of metaphor. Despite the theoretical distinctions, there is very poor experimental evidence addressing the metaphor/metonymy distinction, and none concerning approximation. Here we used meticulously built materials to investigate the interpretation mechanisms of these three phenomena through timed sensicality judgments. Results revealed that interpreting metaphors and approximations differs from literal interpretation both in accuracy and reaction times, with higher difficulty and costs for metaphors than for approximations. This suggests similar albeit gradual interpretative costs, in line with the latest account of Relevance Theory. Metonymy, on the contrary, almost equates literal comprehension and calls for a theoretical distinction from metaphor. Overall, this work represents a first attempt to provide an empirical basis for a theory-sound and psychologically-grounded taxonomy of figurative and loose uses of language.

Depending on feedback timing, the neural structures involved in learning differ, with the dopamine system including the dorsal striatum and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) being more important for learning from immediate than delayed feedback. As stress has been shown to promote striatum‐dependent learning, the current study aimed to explore if stress differentially affects learning from and processing of immediate and delayed feedback. One group of male participants was stressed using the socially evaluated cold pressor test, and another group underwent a control condition. Subsequently, participants performed a reward learning task with immediate (500 ms) and delayed (6,500 ms) feedback while brain activity was assessed with electroencephalography (EEG). While stress enhanced the accuracy for delayed relative to immediate feedback, it reduced the feedback‐related negativity (FRN) valence effect, which is the amplitude difference between negative and positive feedback. For the P300, a reduced valence effect was found in the stress group only for delayed feedback. Frontal theta power was most pronounced for immediate negative feedback and was generally reduced under stress. Moreover, stress reduced associations of FRN and theta power with trial‐by‐trial accuracy. Associations between stress‐induced cortisol increases and EEG components were examined using linear mixed effects analyses, which showed that the described stress effects were accompanied by associations between the stress‐induced cortisol increases and feedback processing. The results indicate that stress and cortisol affect different aspects of feedback processing. Instead of an increased recruitment of the dopamine system and the ACC, the results may suggest enhanced salience processing and reduced cognitive control under stress.