We analyze 3,547 initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1985 through 2003 to determine the impact of acquisition activity on long-run stock performance. The results show that IPOs that acquire within a year of going public significantly underperform for 1- through 5-year holding periods following the 1st year, whereas nonacquiring IPOs do not significantly underperform over these time frames. For example, the mean 3-year style-adjusted abnormal return is – 15.6% for acquirers and 5.9% for nonacquirers. Our cross-sectional and calendar-time results suggest that the acquisition activity of newly public firms plays an important and previously unrecognized role in the long-run underperformance of IPOs.
1 September 2005 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Lockups are agreements made by insiders of stock-issuing firms to abstain from selling shares for a specified period of time after the issue. Brav and Gompers (2003) suggest that lockups are a bonding solution to a moral hazard problem and not a signaling solution to an adverse selection problem. We challenge this conclusion theoretically and empirically. In our model, insiders of good firms signal by putting and keeping (locking up) their money where their mouths are. Our model yields two comparative statics: lockups should be shorter when a firm is i) more transparent and/or ii) more risky. Using a sample of 4,013 initial public offerings and 3,279 seasoned equity offerings between 1988 and 1999, we find empirical support for our theoretical predictions.
We address the role microfinance institutions (MFIs) play in funding entrepreneurial ventures and present a distinction between the types of entrepreneurs that seek MFI and traditional venture funding. We argue that microfinance can serve successfully as seed financing for microentrepreneurs in under-developed economies around the world. By comparing bootstrapping and private equity seed-financing in developed economies to microfinance seed-financing in impoverished economies, we show that the different entrepreneurial characteristics in the two economies have similar funding gaps but are solved with different sources of funding.
28 May 2011 in The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics