Although the inclusion of individuals with lived experience is encouraged within the research process, there remains inconsistent direct involvement in many mental health fields. Within the eating disorders field specifically, there is a very strong and increasing presence of lived experience advocacy. However, due to a number of potential challenges, research undertaken in consultation or in collaboration with individuals with lived experience of an eating disorder is scarce. This paper describes the significant benefits of the inclusion of individuals with lived experience in research. The specific challenges and barriers faced in eating disorders research are also outlined. It is concluded that in addition to existing guidelines on working with lived experience collaborators in mental health research, more specific procedures are required when working with those with eating disorders.

This systematic review and meta-analysis aimed to assess complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) pooled prevalence across global and specific populations (e.g., military, clinical) and examined potential gender differences. We systematically searched five major databases (Web of Science, Scopus, PsycNET, Psych and behavioural sciences collection, PubMed) up to 31/01/2025 for peer-reviewed articles reporting CPTSD prevalence using validated ICD-11 assessments. Articles were assessed for quality using the JBI prevalence checklist; no studies were excluded. In total 138,681 participants from 167 studies were analysed. Gender-specific analyses were conducted where prevalence was reported by gender. A random-effects model with the meta package in R estimated the global pooled prevalence of CPTSD at 6.2 % (95 % CI [3.7 %, 10.3 %]). Prevalence varied across specific trauma-exposed population groups; highest in clinical (44.7 %), domestic violence/sexual abuse survivors (40.0 %), and military (36.4 %) samples, and lowest in emergency services (7.4 %). No gender difference in prevalence was observed. Findings suggest the support systems or selection processes inherent in emergency services may lower CPTSD risk. Conversely, extreme trauma, limited support, or cultural factors may explain elevated prevalence in military samples. High CPTSD prevalence in clinical samples highlight trauma's pervasive impact, underscoring the need for targeted treatment addressing both CPTSD and comorbidities (e.g., mood, anxiety disorders). The absence of gender differences contrasts with typically higher PTSD rates in women. Limitations include inconsistent trauma definitions and lack of clinician-administered instruments. Findings highlight the need for standardised data collection and reporting, gender-specific reporting, and recognition of CPTSD as a comorbidity in clinical settings.

Cognitive flexibility has been previously described as the ability to adjust cognitive and behavioral strategies in response to changing contextual demands. Cognitive flexibility is typically assessed via self-report questionnaires and performance on neuropsychological tests in research and clinical practice. A common assumption among researchers and clinicians is that self-report and neuropsychological tests of cognitive flexibility assess the same or similar constructs, but the extent of the relationship between these two assessment approaches in clinical cohorts remains unknown. We undertook a systematic review and meta-analysis to determine the relationship between self-report and neuropsychological tests of cognitive flexibility in clinical samples. We searched 10 databases and relevant gray literature (e.g., other databases and pearling) from inception to October 2020 and used the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses reporting guidelines. Eleven articles including 405 participants satisfied our eligibility criteria. A multilevel random-effects meta-analysis revealed no relationship between self-report and neuropsychological tests of cognitive flexibility (0.01, 95% CI [-0.16 to 0.18]). Individual random-effects meta-analyses between 12 different tests pairs also found no relationship. Based on our results, it is clear that the two assessment approaches of cognitive flexibility provide independent information-they do not assess the same construct. These findings have important ramifications for future research and clinical practice-there is a need to reconsider what constructs self-report and neuropsychological tests of "cognitive flexibility" actually assess, and avoid the interchangeable use of these assessments in clinical samples. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Cognitive flexibility is a widely studied construct and is considered an important treatment target for several psychological disorders. The convergence of several independent fields of research has led to assumptions about the assessment of cognitive flexibility – assumptions that are not empirically supported and often conflate different notions of flexibility. This critical review discusses how the conflation of self-report and neurocognitive assessments has seemingly arisen from literature on eating disorders. We describe how seminal early observations of “inflexible” personality characteristics, communication competence research, and investigations of frontal lobe function after injury led to two methods of assessing “cognitive flexibility”. We discuss the impact that conflation of self-report and neurocognitive assessments has had on the field, and we provide recommendations for assessing cognitive flexibility in both research and clinical settings. What is already known about this topic: (1) Self-report and neurocognitive assessments of “cognitive flexibility” are commonly used in research and clinical practice. (2) There is uncertainty in the field about whether or not self-report and neurocognitive assessments of “cognitive flexibility” assess similar underlying constructs. (3) Both clinicians and researchers are susceptible to the jingle fallacy. What this topic adds: (1) This narrative critique of the literature reveals that self-report and neurocognitive assessments of “cognitive flexibility” have gradually been conflated over time. (2) Early research in eating disorders seems to have played an influential role in generating and reinforcing such conflation. (3) The assumption that self-report and neurocognitive assessments of “cognitive flexibility” are causally linked has no empirical basis and yet it has been used to explain inflexible cognitions and behaviours in people with eating disorders.