Yujie Xiao

Dr. Yujie Xiao

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 October 2020 in Pattern Recognition Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JZJinghua Zhao
Jinghua Zhao
DZDalin Zeng
Dalin Zeng
YXYujie Xiao
Yujie Xiao
LCLiping Che
Liping Che
MWMengjiao Wang
Mengjiao Wang

11 July 2017 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SYShuai Yang
Shuai Yang
YXYujie Xiao
Yujie Xiao
YKYong-Hong Kuo
Yong-Hong Kuo
It has been a challenging task to manage perishable food supply chains because of the perishable product’s short lifetime, the possible spoilage of the product due to its deterioration nature, and the retail demand uncertainty. All of these factors can lead to a significant amount of shortage of food items and a substantial retail loss. The recent development of tracing and tracking technologies, which facilitate effective monitoring of the inventory level and product quality continuously, can greatly improve the performance of food supply chain and reduce spoilage waste. Motivated by this recent technological advancement, our research aims to investigate the joint decision of pricing strategy, shelf space allocation, and replenishment policy in a single-item food supply chain setting, where our goal is to maximize the retailer’s total expected profit subject to stochastic retail demand. We prove the existence of optimality for the design of the perishable food supply chain. We then extend the single-item supply chain problem to a multi-item setting and propose an easy-to-implement searching algorithm to produce the optimal allocation of shelf space among these items for practical implementation. Finally, we provide numerical examples to demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution.

25 August 2017 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Shuai YangShuai Yang
Shuai Yang
YXYujie Xiao
Yujie Xiao
YZYan Zheng
Yan Zheng
YLYan Liu
Yan Liu
With the intensification of global warming and the levy of energy tax, more industries are paying attention to energy saving and reduction of carbon footprint. For the food industry, energy cost in the supply chain of perishable food is quite high because of cold-chain transport and storage. Therefore, the efficacies of cold chain management and inventory control are the key factors that increase the efficiency of food supply chain and make it more ecological. This research analyzes the degradation process of perishable food and determines the optimal temperature of the cold chain as well as the optimal price to maximize the channel profit. We prove that there is an optimal price with a certain temperature and develop an efficient search algorithm to find the optimal temperature. We also perform sensitivity analyses to test which parameters affect the channel profit significantly. Numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the proposed models.

1 October 2021 in Journal of Cleaner Production
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YXYujie Xiao
Yujie Xiao
YZYan Zheng
Yan Zheng
YYYuantang Yu
Yuantang Yu
LZLianmin Zhang
Lianmin Zhang
XLXiaowei Lin
Xiaowei Lin
BLBin Li
Bin Li

WYWei Yu
Wei Yu
TWTao Wang
Tao Wang
YXYujie Xiao
Yujie Xiao
JCJun Chen
Jun Chen
XYXingchen Yan
Xingchen Yan
With the strengthening of environmental awareness, the government pays much more attention to environmental protection and thus implements carbon trading schemes to promote the reduction of global carbon dioxide emissions. The carbon Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is an incentive mechanism for citizens to value their energy conservation and carbon reduction. Individual travel needs to rely on various means of transportation, resulting in energy consumption. Carbon tax or subsidy can only be carried out after carbon GSP accurately measures individual carbon emissions. The big data acquired from the smart cards of passengers’ travels provide the possibility for carbon emission accounting of individual travel. This research proposes a carbon emission measurement of individual travel. Through establishing the network model of the Nanjing metro with a complex method, the shortest path of the passengers’ travels is obtained. Combined with the origination–destination (OD) records of the smart cards, the total distance of the passengers’ travels is obtained. By selecting the operation table to estimate the carbon emissions generated by the daily operation of the subway system, the carbon emissions per kilometer or per time of passenger travel are finally obtained. With the accurate tracking of carbon emissions for individual travel, the government may establish a comprehensive monitoring system so as to establish a carbon tax and carbon supplement mechanism for citizens.

30 July 2016 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YXYujie Xiao
Yujie Xiao
Shuai YangShuai Yang
Shuai Yang
LZLianmin Zhang
Lianmin Zhang
YKYong-Hong Kuo
Yong-Hong Kuo
In this paper, we consider a two-echelon sustainable supply chain with price-sensitive demand. The government taxes the carbon footprint of each item caused by producing, transporting, and consuming the products. Both the supplier and retailer can exert efforts to reduce the carbon footprint. In a non-cooperative setting, the government only taxes the supplier, so that the retailer has no incentive to exert any effort to reduce the carbon footprint and the supplier merely decides on the selling price to maximize its own profit. We develop a centralized supply chain and show that there is an optimal solution to maximize the channel profit. Since the centralized policy may not be always not practical, we propose a tax-sharing contract, where both parties profit from the carbon footprint reduction. This problem is modeled as the Stackelberg game and Nash game. The results show that the leader has more power than the follower, which results in more profit. The Stackelberg game provides boundaries for both parties’ profits in the Nash game. Although the tax-sharing contract does not result in full cooperation, its efficiency is still much higher than that of the non-cooperative case. The results are illustrated with some numerical experiments.