Many industry leaders and academics from the field of machine ethics would have us believe that the inevitability of robots coming to have a larger role in our lives demands that robots be endowed with moral reasoning capabilities. Robots endowed in this way may be referred to as artificial moral agents (AMA). Reasons often given for developing AMAs are: the prevention of harm, the necessity for public trust, the prevention of immoral use, such machines are better moral reasoners than humans, and building these machines would lead to a better understanding of human morality. Although some scholars have challenged the very initiative to develop AMAs, what is currently missing from the debate is a closer examination of the reasons offered by machine ethicists to justify the development of AMAs. This closer examination is especially needed because of the amount of funding currently being allocated to the development of AMAs (from funders like Elon Musk) coupled with the amount of attention researchers and industry leaders receive in the media for their efforts in this direction. The stakes in this debate are high because moral robots would make demands on society; answers to a host of pending questions about what counts as an AMA and whether they are morally responsible for their behavior or not. This paper shifts the burden of proof back to the machine ethicists demanding that they give good reasons to build AMAs. The paper argues that until this is done, the development of commercially available AMAs should not proceed further.

There is widespread agreement that there should be a principle requiring that artificial intelligence (AI) be ‘explicable’. Microsoft, Google, the World Economic Forum, the draft AI ethics guidelines for the EU commission, etc. all include a principle for AI that falls under the umbrella of ‘explicability’. Roughly, the principle states that “for AI to promote and not constrain human autonomy, our ‘decision about who should decide’ must be informed by knowledge of how AI would act instead of us” (Floridi et al. in Minds Mach 28(4):689–707, 2018). There is a strong intuition that if an algorithm decides, for example, whether to give someone a loan, then that algorithm should be explicable. I argue here, however, that such a principle is misdirected. The property of requiring explicability should attach to a particular action or decision rather than the entity making that decision. It is the context and the potential harm resulting from decisions that drive the moral need for explicability—not the process by which decisions are reached. Related to this is the fact that AI is used for many low-risk purposes for which it would be unnecessary to require that it be explicable. A principle requiring explicability would prevent us from reaping the benefits of AI used in these situations. Finally, the explanations given by explicable AI are only fruitful if we already know which considerations are acceptable for the decision at hand. If we already have these considerations, then there is no need to use contemporary AI algorithms because standard automation would be available. In other words, a principle of explicability for AI makes the use of AI redundant.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is becoming increasingly important for the infrastructures that support many of society’s functions. Transportation, security, energy, education, the workplace, the government have all incorporated AI into their infrastructures for enhancement and/or protection. In this paper, we argue that not only is AI seen as a tool for augmenting existing infrastructures, but AI itself is becoming an infrastructure that many services of today and tomorrow will depend upon. Considering the vast environmental consequences associated with the development and use of AI, of which the world is only starting to learn, the necessity of addressing AI alongside the concept of infrastructure points toward the phenomenon of carbon lock-in. Carbon lock-in refers to society’s constrained ability to reduce carbon emissions technologically, economically, politically, and socially. These constraints are due to the inherent inertia created by entrenched technological, institutional, and behavioral norms. That is, the drive for AI adoption in virtually every sector of society will create dependencies and interdependencies from which it will be hard to escape. The crux of this paper boils down to this: in conceptualizing AI as infrastructure we can recognize the risk of lock-in, not just carbon lock-in but lock-in as it relates to all the physical needs to achieve the infrastructure of AI. This does not exclude the possibility of solutions arising with the rise of these technologies; however, given these points, it is of the utmost importance that we ask inconvenient questions regarding these environmental costs before becoming locked into this new AI infrastructure.

With Artificial Intelligence (AI) entering our lives in novel ways—both known and unknown to us—there is both the enhancement of existing ethical issues associated with AI as well as the rise of new ethical issues. There is much focus on opening up the ‘black box’ of modern machine-learning algorithms to understand the reasoning behind their decisions—especially morally salient decisions. However, some applications of AI which are no doubt beneficial to society rely upon these black boxes. Rather than requiring algorithms to be transparent we should focus on constraining AI and those machines powered by AI within microenvironments—both physical and virtual—which allow these machines to realize their function whilst preventing harm to humans. In the field of robotics this is called ‘envelopment’. However, to put an ‘envelope’ around AI-powered machines we need to know some basic things about them which we are often in the dark about. The properties we need to know are the: training data, inputs, functions, outputs, and boundaries. This knowledge is a necessary first step towards the envelopment of AI-powered machines. It is only with this knowledge that we can responsibly regulate, use, and live in a world populated by these machines.

The concept of Meaningful Human Control (MHC) has gained prominence in the field of Artificial Intelligence ethics. MHC is discussed in relation to lethal autonomous weapons, autonomous cars, and more recently, AI systems in general. Little, however, has been done to analyze the concept. Those using MHC tend to look at it narrowly and intuitively—as if it is clear what it means. They fail to see the many issues concerning human control over machines. In this article, I break the concept into its three constitutive words (‘meaningful’, ‘human’, and, ‘control’) to outline the many meanings of MHC. While the intention is not to come to the real meaning of MHC, this analysis brings up the many issues that should be considered if meaningful human control is to be realized. These include: which humans count as meaningful in the application context, whether the control those humans are given must be meaningful, whether humans must retain control over the things that are meaningful in life, whether the style of control is human-like, whether each actor (designer, operator, subject, government) has the control they need, and what it is exactly that a human is controlling (e.g., the training data, the inputs, the outputs, etc. of the AI system).