By contextualising the striking similarities in Feuerbach and Kierkegaard’s conceptions of sin as infinite qualitative difference, and the related question of the individual and the species as a shared response to the Hegelian Entzweiung, this article seeks to offer a new framework for understanding Feuerbach’s critique of Christian theology and of Kierkegaard’s famous articulation of the infinite qualitative difference as simultaneously ontological, hamartiological, and soteriological. It argues that Kierkegaard offers a modification of the Feuerbachian account to argue against Feuerbach’s conclusion that the Christian doctrine of sin negates qualitative differences between individual humans, and to conversely affirm that sin differentiates not just God and humans, but each single individual too. Kierkegaard might be said to at once uphold Feuerbach’s critique of Hegelian theology, while inverting Feuerbach’s anti-theological programme by harnessing the ambiguities that appear in Feuerbach’s account of sin. It is thereby shown how both Feuerbach and Kierkegaard make use of Hegelian logic, both through their formal application of the concepts of quality and quantity, as well as their creative appropriation of the notion of Entzweiung.
This article explores the epistemological aspects of dialogue through an engagement with the Danish existence thinker, Søren Kierkegaard. I argue that dialogue plays an integral role in the epistemic process tentatively sketched by Kierkegaard. To show this, I start by examining Kierkegaard’s criticism of non-dialogical approaches to knowing. Offering a corrective, Kierkegaard instead operates with a contact theory of knowledge analogising knowing and breathing to underline the importance of receptivity and relationality in the epistemic process. By placing Kierkegaard in conversation with his pseudonym Johannes Climacus, dialogue can be seen to play a crucial role in two ways. Firstly, Kierkegaard and Climacus creatively re-appropriate and reconstruct dialogical aporia textually to encourage receptivity and make the needed space for knowledge. Secondly, Kierkegaard’s and Climacus’s invocations of dialogue implicitly and explicitly centre the second-person perspective in different ways to emphasise the importance of “contact” and relation in knowing. I argue that although this perspective can ultimately be considered a second-order perspective, it points not only to receptivity, but also to relationality as both an object of knowledge and as part of the epistemic process itself.
This chapter examines Hans Lassen Martensen’s categorization of German medieval mysticism as “upbuilding religious popular-philosophy” in his 1840 monograph Meister Eckhart. Martensen’s repeated call to engage with the German mystics as a means for upbuilding has been overlooked and even explicitly denied in scholarship because of Martensen’s assessment that we must ultimately go beyond mysticism in order to gain objective knowledge. Exploring Martensen’s interpretation of mysticism as upbuilding philosophy will form the basis for considering Kierkegaard’s reception of Martensen’s Eckhart book and possible implicit engagement with Eckhart. It will be argued that Kierkegaard upholds Martensen’s view of mysticism as upbuilding philosophy, but defends mysticism from Martensen’s conclusion that speculative theology surpasses the subjective upbuilding popular-philosophical standpoint of mysticism. In addition, this chapter points out that Martensen and Kierkegaard share significant similarities in their respective engagements with mysticism as a form of upbuilding philosophy—more significant than they may have realized or cared to admit. <!----> <!----> <!----> <!---->
3 July 2021 in Studia Theologica - Nordic Journal of Theology
This paper brings to light the overlooked existential commitments of the Danish speculative theologian Hans Lassen Martensen. Primarily known and studied today for being the arch-rival of Søren Kierkegaard, Martensen continues to suffer under his Kierkegaardian caricature as a courtesan to Hegelian speculative thought and to Christendom’s cultural religiosity. In contrast to this portrayal, this paper argues that Martensen’s thought can be viewed as part of a wider existentialist movement developing in nineteenth-century Danish philosophy in response to the dry abstractions of rationalism. It is shown that Martensen’s theological and ethical positions spring from a deep-seated concern with questions of existence, which find expression in three distinct but related moments of Martensen’s theological authorship: Firstly, in his definition of religion as an existential relation, secondly in his view that dogmatic theology should be understood as existential knowledge, and finally by understanding his theological ethics as existential striving.
In his recent work Hors phénomène, Emmanuel Falque identifies the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard as both a progenitor and exemplifier of his account of the way philosophy becomes more rigorously itself through an encounter with theology. However, this article challenges the affinity Falque claims to share with Kierkegaard. It argues instead that there is a fundamental philosophical discrepancy underlying their respective treatments of the encounter between philosophy and theology: the nature of the dialectic and their respective positions in it. By exploring Falque's and Kierkegaard's diverging uses of the metaphor of ‘crossing the Rubicon’, the article demonstrates that where Kierkegaard stresses the military sense of the metaphor, depicting the relationship between the two disciplines as that between two armies seeking the annihilation of the other, Falque precisely abstracts from this military sense, letting the expression instead become a metaphor for a mutually beneficial transformative encounter. However, when considered more profoundly, we argue that this annihilation is itself a Christian experience out of which Falque's transformation is born. Ultimately, we conclude that Falque and Kierkegaard are both trying to conceive of the relationship between philosophy and theology according to a somewhat similar structure, namely, the quantitative intensification of one discipline by way of its qualitative differentiation from the other.
15 February 2026 in Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry
Non-suicidal self-harm, particularly the phenomenon of cutting, is gaining increasing academic attention. However, most existing literature approaches this topic from clinical, cultural, or historical perspectives, often neglecting an in-depth exploration of the lived experiences of individuals engaging in self-harm. Notably, within the context of mental illnesses, self-harm is often viewed merely as a symptomatic behavior and consequently addressed solely through symptomatic treatments. This article draws on data from the first and last authors’ extensive projects focusing on individuals living with mental illnesses in Denmark. Over a period of four years, we closely followed 19 participants (in two different projects) in various aspects of their daily lives, including periods of hospitalization. The article also includes uncensured images of self-harm, provided by participants with their permission to publish. We aim to underscore self-harm not only as the experiential nexus of a complex relationship between the body and the world but also as a mechanism for overcoming the self. Drawing inspiration from Kierkegaard’s reflections on selfhood and despair, we propose the concept of ‘enacted selfhood’ as an analytical framework for comprehending self-harm among individuals living with mental illness.