Jonathan Herring

Prof. Jonathan Herring

University of Oxford, Oxford, Oxfordshire, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

30Years (1997-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2016
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Book
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JHJonathan Herring
Jonathan Herring
In an examination of the legal position of vulnerable adults, understood as those who have capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 but are deemed impaired through vulnerability in their exercise of decision making powers, this book challenges that assumption. We are all ‘vulnerable’ and need to replace the competent, able-bodied, independent person as the norm which the law is based on and instead recognize our interdependence and mutuality. At the heart of the law is a distinction between those who have capacity and those who do not. Those who have capacity are given full legal rights; they are entitled to enter contracts, dispose of their property, and are able to marry. Those who are deemed to lack capacity are unable to make these decisions. Decisions are made on their behalf based on an assessment of what is in their best interests. The Court of Protection and the Court of Appeal have developed a jurisdiction to deal with cases involving vulnerable adults which has proved controversial. This book welcomes the courts willingness to protect vulnerable adults through the inherent jurisdiction, but argues that we need to go further. Caring relationships should be at the heart of the legal system.

14 February 2007 in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
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Journal Article
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MDMichelle Madden Dempsey
Michelle Madden Dempsey
JHJonathan Herring
Jonathan Herring
And Victor Tadros. We are also grateful to participants at seminars at the Universities of Manchester and Lancashire where a version of this article was presented. The usual caveats apply. 1 For simplicity, we will refer to this type of penetration as 'sexual penetration'. In order to limit the scope of our inquiry, we do not consider the issue of same-sex penetration, oral penetration, or penetration with object(s) or body part (s) other than a penis. Rather, our claim is limited to penile penetration of the female vagina or anus. We note that our use of the term sexual penetration therefore differs from its meaning under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 1.

8 August 2017 in The Cambridge Law Journal
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Journal Article
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JHJonathan Herring
Jonathan Herring
JWJesse Wall
Jesse Wall
This article seeks to explain and explore the concept of bodily integrity. The concept is often elided with autonomy in the case law and the academic literature. It argues that bodily integrity is non-reducible to the principle of autonomy. Bodily integrity relates to the integration of the self and the rest of the objective world. A breach of it, therefore, is significantly different to inteference in decisions about your body. This explains why interference with bodily integrity requires justification beyond what will suffice for an interference with autonomy. It also explores how this understanding of bodily integrity assists in understanding disability, gender and separated bodily material.

6 November 2013 in Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law
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Journal Article
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JHJonathan Herring
Jonathan Herring
This article considers the use of presumptions by courts when interpreting the welfare principle in the Children Act 1989. It notes that in recent years the courts have turned away from the use of presumptions and preferred to apply the welfare principle to the facts of the case, free from generalisations. This article is supportive of this move, but explores the reasons why presumptions appeal to some lawyers. While the courts have generally, quite properly, rejected these arguments, one has not been considered sufficiently. That is that presumptions are used to indicate that the law believes that a particular matter constitutes an intrinsic good for children. While this argument is not supported by the author, it may better explain the support for presumptions, than the arguments commonly relied upon.

1 December 2015 in Legal Studies
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JHJonathan Herring
Jonathan Herring
JWJesse Wall
Jesse Wall

12 March 2009
Verified
Book
Closed access
JHJonathan Herring
Jonathan Herring
This book examines the legal rights and responsibilities of older people. Although the focus is particularly on the legal issues surrounding old age it draws extensively on the gerentological, philosophical, sociological, and medical literature surrounding the subject. The book examines the key issues surrounding ageing and law: ageism and age discrimination; mental capacity; care and older people; elder abuse; pensions and benefits for older people; grandparents; the health care of older people; and inheritance issues. These issues raise complex social and legal issues. The book highlights the many ways our social and legal systems let older people down and makes proposals as to how these could be improved. It argues that the devaluation of ageing and the social exclusion of older people not only impoverishes the lives of older people, but of society generally.