Consciousness is now a well-established field of empirical research. A large body of experimental results has been accumulated and is steadily growing. In parallel, many Theories of Consciousness (ToCs) have been proposed. These theories are diverse in nature, ranging from computational to neurophysiological and quantum theoretical approaches. This contrasts with other fields of natural science, which host a smaller number of competing theories. We suggest that one reason for this abundance of extremely different theories may be the lack of stringent criteria specifying how empirical data constrains ToCs. First, we argue that consciousness is a well-defined topic from an empirical point of view and motivate a purely empirical stance on the quest for consciousness. Second, we present a checklist of criteria that, we propose, empirical ToCs need to cope with. Third, we review 13 of the most influential ToCs and subject them to the criteria. Our analysis helps to situate these different ToCs in the theoretical landscapeand sheds light on their strengths and weaknesses from a strictly empirical point of view.
In crowding, perception of a target is strongly deteriorated by nearby elements. Crowding is often explained by pooling models predicting that adding flankers increases crowding. In contrast, the centroid hypothesis proposes that adding flankers decreases crowding—“bigger is better.” In foveal vision, we have recently shown that adding flankers can increase or decrease crowding depending on whether the target groups or ungroups from the flankers. We have further shown how configural effects, such as good and global Gestalt, determine crowding. Foveal and peripheral crowding do not always reveal the same characteristics. Here, we show that the very same grouping and Gestalt results of foveal vision are also found in the periphery. These results can neither be explained by simple pooling nor by centroid models. We discuss when bigger is better and how grouping might shape crowding.
Is consciousness a continuous stream of percepts or is it discrete, occurring only at certain moments in time? This question has puzzled philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists for centuries. Both hypotheses have fallen repeatedly in and out of favor. Here, we review recent studies exploring long-lasting postdictive effects and show that the results favor a two-stage discrete model, in which substantial periods of continuous unconscious processing precede discrete conscious percepts. We propose that such a model marries the advantages of both continuous and discrete models and resolves centuries old debates about perception and consciousness.
In crowding, the perception of a target strongly deteriorates when neighboring elements are presented. Crowding is usually assumed to have the following characteristics. (a) Crowding is determined only by nearby elements within a restricted region around the target (Bouma's law). (b) Increasing the number of flankers can only deteriorate performance. (c) Target-flanker interference is feature-specific. These characteristics are usually explained by pooling models, which are well in the spirit of classic models of object recognition. In this review, we summarize recent findings showing that crowding is not determined by the above characteristics, thus, challenging most models of crowding. We propose that the spatial configuration across the entire visual field determines crowding. Only when one understands how all elements of a visual scene group with each other, can one determine crowding strength. We put forward the hypothesis that appearance (i.e., how stimuli look) is a good predictor for crowding, because both crowding and appearance reflect the output of recurrent processing rather than interactions during the initial phase of visual processing.
To reveal the mechanisms of spatial interference in the fovea, we examined the capacity of a variety of lateral flanking configurations to interfere with alignment thresholds of a vertical vernier. A single line on each side of the vernier, at the optimal separation of 2–3 arcmin, raises thresholds threefold or more and masks most effectively when its length equals that of the vernier. For an array of equal lines whose length differs from that of the vernier, masking is reduced but not when vernier and flanks have the same length. The reduction for shorter and longer flanks can be reversed by inserting a gap in the row of flanks. By comparing the masking effect of arrays of mixed line lengths, we show that when a pair of flanks, which by itself masks strongly, becomes a component of a coherent contextual configuration, it loses much of its effectiveness to interact. Observers' ranking of the conspicuity of the vernier test pattern among the flanking elements is negatively correlated with the threshold elevation. We conclude that clustering of contextual patterns influences their capacity to mask. Discrimination of a target deteriorates when the target is grouped within an array of surrounding elements.
In object recognition, features are thought to be processed in a hierarchical fashion from low-level analysis (edges and lines) to complex figural processing (shapes and objects). Here, we show that figural processing determines low-level processing. Vernier offset discrimination strongly deteriorated when we embedded a vernier in a square. This is a classic crowding effect. Surprisingly, crowding almost disappeared when additional squares were added. We propose that figural interactions between the squares precede low-level suppression of the vernier by the single square, contrary to hierarchical models of object recognition.