Daniele Vilone

Dr. Daniele Vilone

LABSS (Laboratory of Agent Based Social Simulation), Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology, National Research Council (CNR), Via Palestro 32, 00185 Rome, ItalyGrupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC), Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Spain
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 July 2019 in Journal of The Royal Society Interface
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Valerio CapraroValerio Capraro
Valerio Capraro
Matjaz PercMatjaz Perc
Matjaz Perc
Daniele ViloneDaniele Vilone
Daniele Vilone
Lies can have profoundly negative consequences for individuals, groups and even for societies. Understanding how lying evolves and when it proliferates is therefore of significant importance for our personal and societal well-being. To that effect, we here study the sender–receiver game in well-mixed populations with methods of statistical physics. We use the Monte Carlo method to determine the stationary frequencies of liars and believers for four different lie types. We consider altruistic white lies that favour the receiver at a cost to the sender, black lies that favour the sender at a cost to the receiver, spiteful lies that harm both the sender and the receiver, and Pareto white lies that favour both the sender and the receiver. We find that spiteful lies give rise to trivial behaviour, where senders quickly learn that their best strategy is to send a truthful message, while receivers likewise quickly learn that their best strategy is to believe the sender’s message. For altruistic white lies and black lies, we find that most senders lie while most receivers do not believe the sender’s message, but the exact frequencies of liars and non-believers depend significantly on the payoffs, and they also evolve non-monotonically before reaching the stationary state. Lastly, for Pareto white lies we observe the most complex dynamics, with the possibility of both lying and believing evolving with all frequencies between 0 and 1 in dependence on the payoffs. We discuss the implications of these results for moral behaviour in human experiments.

22 August 2014 in Physical Review E
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Daniele ViloneDaniele Vilone
Daniele Vilone
JRJosé J. Ramasco
José J. Ramasco
ASAngel Sánchez
Angel Sánchez
Maxi San MiguelMaxi San Miguel
Maxi San Miguel
The interplay of social and strategic motivations in human interactions is a largely unexplored topic in collective social phenomena. Whether individuals' decisions are taken in a purely strategic basis or due to social pressure without a rational background crucially influences the model outcome. Here we study a networked Prisoner's Dilemma in which decisions are made either based on the replication of the most successful neighbor's strategy (unconditional imitation) or by pure social imitation following an update rule inspired by the voter model. The main effects of the voter dynamics are an enhancement of the final consensus, i.e., asymptotic states are generally uniform, and a promotion of cooperation in certain regions of the parameter space as compared to the outcome of purely strategic updates. Thus, voter dynamics acts as an interface noise and has a similar effect as a pure random noise; furthermore, its influence is mostly independent of the network heterogeneity. When strategic decisions are made following other update rules such as the replicator or Moran processes, the dynamic mixed state found under unconditional imitation for some parameters disappears, but an increase of cooperation in certain parameter regions is still observed. Comparing our results with recent experiments on the Prisoner's Dilemma, we conclude that such a mixed dynamics may explain moody conditional cooperation among the agents.

13 March 2020 in Physical Review E
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Valerio CapraroValerio Capraro
Valerio Capraro
Matjaz PercMatjaz Perc
Matjaz Perc
Daniele ViloneDaniele Vilone
Daniele Vilone
Lies can have a negating impact on governments, companies, and the society as a whole. Understanding the dynamics of lying is therefore of crucial importance across different fields of research. While lying has been studied before in well-mixed populations, it is a fact that real interactions are rarely well-mixed. Indeed, they are usually structured and thus best described by networks. Here we therefore use the Monte Carlo method to study the evolution of lying in the sender-receiver game in a one-parameter family of networks, systematically covering complete networks, small-world networks, and one-dimensional rings. We show that lies that benefit the sender at a cost to the receiver, the so-called black lies, are less likely to proliferate on networks than they do in well-mixed populations. Honesty is thus more likely to evolve, but only when the benefit for the sender is smaller than the cost for the receiver. Moreover, this effect is particularly strong in small-world networks, but less so in the one-dimensional ring. For lies that favor the receiver at a cost to the sender, the so-called altruistic white lies, we show that honesty is also more likely to evolve than it is in well-mixed populations. But contrary to black lies, this effect is more expressed in the one-dimensional ring, whereas in small-world networks it is present only when the cost to the sender is greater than the benefit for the receiver. Last, for lies that benefit both the sender and the receiver, the so-called Pareto white lies, we show that the network structure actually favors the evolution of lying, but this only occurs when the benefit for the sender is slightly greater than the benefit for the receiver. In this case again the small-world topology acts as an amplifier of the effect, while other network topologies fail to do the same. In addition to these main results we discuss several other findings, which together show clearly that the structure of interactions and the overall topology of the network critically determine the dynamics of lying.

1 September 2015 in Frontiers in Physics
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FGFrancesca Giardini
Francesca Giardini
Daniele ViloneDaniele Vilone
Daniele Vilone
RCRosaria Conte
Rosaria Conte
The study of opinions − e.g., their formation and change, and their effects on our society − by means of theoretical and numerical models has been one of the main goals of sociophysics until now, but it is one of the defining topics addressed by social psychology and complexity science. Despite the flourishing of different models and theories, several key questions still remain unanswered. The aim of this paper is to provide a cognitively grounded computational model of opinions in which they are described as mental representations and defined in terms of distinctive mental features. We also define how these representations change dynamically through different processes, describing the interplay between mental and social dynamics of opinions. We present two versions of the model, one with discrete opinions (voter model-like), and one with continuous ones (Deffuant-like). By means of numerical simulations, we compare the behaviour of our cognitive model with the classical sociophysical models, and we identify interesting differences in the dynamics of consensus for each of the models considered.

11 January 2024 in PLOS ONE
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Daniele ViloneDaniele Vilone
Daniele Vilone
EPEugenia Polizzi
Eugenia Polizzi
In the last decades an increasing deal of research has investigated the phenomenon of opinion misperception in human communities and, more recently, in social media. Opinion misperception is the wrong evaluation by community’s members of the real distribution of opinions or beliefs about a given topic. In this work we explore the mechanisms giving rise to opinion misperception in social media groups, which are larger than physical ones and have peculiar topological features. By means of numerical simulations, we suggest that the structure of connections of such communities plays indeed a role in distorting the perception of the agents about others’ beliefs, but it is essentially an indirect effect. Moreover, we show that the main ingredient that generates misperception is a spiral of silence induced by few, well connected and charismatic agents, which rapidly drives the majority of individuals to stay silent without disclosing their true belief, leading minoritarian opinions to appear more widespread throughout the community.

1 April 2011 in Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
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Daniele ViloneDaniele Vilone
Daniele Vilone
ASA Sánchez
A Sánchez
JGJesús Gomez Gardeñes
Jesús Gomez Gardeñes
We study in detail the role of short-cuts in promoting the emergence of cooperation in a network of agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG). We introduce a model whose topology interpolates between the one-dimensional Euclidean lattice (a ring) and the complete graph by changing the value of one parameter (the probability p of adding a link between two nodes not already connected in the Euclidean configuration). We show that there is a region of values of p in which cooperation is greatly enhanced, whilst for smaller values of p only a few cooperators are present in the final state, and for p -> 1(-) cooperation is totally suppressed. We present analytical arguments that provide a very plausible interpretation of the simulation results, thus unveiling the mechanism by which short-cuts contribute to promoting (or suppressing) cooperation.