Kjell Hausken

Prof. Kjell Hausken

University of Stavanger
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

27Years (2000-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 September 2014 in African Development Review
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Journal Article
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MNMthuli Ncube
Mthuli Ncube
JAJohn C. Anyanwu
John C. Anyanwu
Kjell HauskenKjell Hausken
Kjell Hausken


28 May 2022 in Technological Forecasting and Social Change
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Journal Article
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ABAlnoor Bhimani
Alnoor Bhimani
Kjell HauskenKjell Hausken
Kjell Hausken
SASameen Arif
Sameen Arif

24 March 2016 in Defence and Peace Economics
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Kjell HauskenKjell Hausken
Kjell Hausken
A cost–benefit analysis of terrorist attacks is developed and placed within a systematic theoretical structure. For the target or object of the attack, we consider the lost value of human lives, lost economic value, and lost influence value, counted as benefits for the terrorist. The corresponding losses for the terrorist are counted as costs. The terrorist attacks if benefits outweigh costs. Bounded rationality is enabled where the three kinds of benefits and costs can be weighted differently. We account for two ex ante probabilities of successful planning and attack, and enable the terrorist to assign different weights to its multiple stakeholders. We introduce multiple time periods, time discounting, attitudes towards risk, and subcategories for the benefits and costs. The cost–benefit analysis is illustrated with the 11 September 2001 attack, and 53 incidents in the Global Terrorism Database yielding both positive and negative expected utilities. The paper is intended as a tool for scientists and policy-makers, as a way of thinking about costs and benefits of terrorist attacks.

1 January 2017 in European Journal of Operational Research
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Kjell HauskenKjell Hausken
Kjell Hausken

1 January 2011 in International Journal of Systems Science
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Kjell HauskenKjell Hausken
Kjell Hausken
Infrastructures are analysed subject to defence by a strategic defender and attack by multiple strategic attackers. A framework is developed where each agent determines how much to invest in defending versus attacking each of multiple targets. A target can have economic, human and symbolic values, which generally vary across agents. Investment expenditure functions for each agent can be linear in the investment effort, concave, convex, logistic, can increase incrementally, or can be subject to budget constraints. Contest success functions (e.g., ratio and difference forms) determine the probability of a successful attack on each target, dependent on the relative investments of the defender and attackers on each target, and on characteristics of the contest. Targets can be in parallel, in series, interlinked, interdependent or independent. The defender minimises the expected damage plus the defence expenditures. Each attacker maximises the expected damage minus the attack expenditures. The number of free choice variables equals the number of agents times the number of targets, or lower if there are budget constraints. Each agent is interested in how his investments vary across the targets, and the impact on his utilities. Alternative optimisation programmes are discussed, together with repeated games, dynamic games and incomplete information. An example is provided for illustration.