Supply chain sustainability has become significantly important in the fashion industry, and more and more fashion brands have invested in developing sustainable supply chains. We note that dual channel system comprising a brand-owned direct channel and retail outsourcing channel is quite common in the fashion industry, and in the latter, buy-back contract is popular between brands and retailers. Therefore, we build a stylized dual channel model with price competition and demand uncertainty to characterize the main properties of a fashion supply chain. Our foci are the sustainability analysis and the channel coordination mechanism. We first design a buy-back contract with return cost to coordinate the channel. We then study supply chain sustainability and examine the effect of two key influencing factors, i.e., price competition and demand uncertainty. Interestingly, we find that a fiercer price competition will lead to a more sustainable supply chain. From the perspective of supply chain managers, we conclude that (1) if managers care about environmental sustainability, fierce price competition is not a suggested strategy; (2) if managers care about economic sustainability, fierce price competition is an advantageous strategy. We also find that high demand uncertainty results in a less sustainable supply chain, in both an environmental and economic sustainability sense.

Blockchain technology (BCT) has emerged as a promising solution for ensuring supply chain traceability. However, not all consumers have a comprehensive understanding of the benefits associated with BCT-enabled traceability. This study investigates the impacts of consumer awareness on the adoption of BCT within a supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. We develop two distinct scenarios: (1) Scenario B, where the supply chain traceability is managed via traditional digital systems, and (2) Scenario E, where the supply chain traceability is managed via BCT-enabled systems. We introduce the concept of consumer traceability awareness level, representing the proportion of the consumer population that are knowledgeable about the advantages of these traceability technologies. The findings reveal that the adoption of BCT enhances the overall performance of the supply chain and makes it more sensitive to the consumer traceability awareness level. Nonetheless, the manufacturer consistently experiences advantages from BCT adoption, whereas the retailer's situation may deteriorate. In both scenarios, a low traceability awareness level prompts the retailer to target all consumers, whereas a high traceability awareness level shifts its focus solely to the knowledgeable consumers. Intriguingly, the adoption of BCT shifts the retailer's inclination towards targeting the knowledgeable consumers rather than all consumers.

This study investigates the slot–sharing strategies of two container shipping liners (CSLs) engage in service competition within a shipping market characterized by uncertain demand. We develop a game–theoretic model where CSLs decide whether to enter a slot–sharing agreement and determine their service quality levels. Three typical agreements, namely, transfer–payment, revenue–sharing, and cost–sharing, are examined, with slot–sharing arrangements and transactions are implemented after demand uncertainty is realized. Equilibrium service quality levels and profits under different agreements are derived, and numerical experiments analyze the impacts of key parameters. We find that the transfer–payment agreement generally yields higher profits than the other two but reduces service quality due to diminished competition. Interestingly, we find that slot–sharing does not always outperform no slot–sharing. When service competition is intense and transfer–payment prices are low, the CSLs may achieve higher profits by operating independently. In addition, we demonstrate that slot–sharing can achieve a win–win situation where both service quality and CSL profits improve under moderate service competition and balanced transfer–payment prices.

In multitier supply chains, brand-owners often form exclusive deals with downstream retailers or upstream suppliers. Therefore, the selection of exclusive channel strategies becomes a critical decision for brand owners, resulting in three typical structures: a flexible structure, an exclusive retailing-channel structure, and an exclusive purchasing-channel structure. This paper contributes to the literature by formulating these three representative channel structures in a three-tier supply chain. Both observable and unobservable contracts are considered in each structure. We build game-theoretical models and derive the equilibrium outcomes under observable and unobservable contracts. We find that the exclusive retailing channel is more beneficial for brand-owners, regardless of whether the contracts are observable or unobservable. Additionally, the exclusive retailing channel benefits the entire supply chain more than the exclusive purchasing channel when the level of channel substitutability is low (high) under contract observability (unobservability). With regard to the effect of contract unobservability, we find that it can benefit brand-owners when the level of channel substitutability is low, but it can harm them when the level of channel substitutability is high. Furthermore, we explore the effects of channel substitutability and demonstrate that brand-owners’ performance can be positively and negatively affected by the channel substitutability under contract unobservability. Our findings provide operational strategies for brand-owners to form exclusive channels in a multitier supply chain.