In silico predictions combined with in vitro, in vivo, and in situ observations collectively suggest that mouse adaptation of the severe acute respiratory syndrome 2 virus requires an aromatic substitution in position 501 or position 498 (but not both) of the spike protein’s receptor binding domain. This effect could be enhanced by mutations in positions 417, 484, and 493 (especially K417N, E484K, Q493K, and Q493R), and to a lesser extent by mutations in positions 486 and 499 (such as F486L and P499T). Such enhancements, due to more favorable binding interactions with residues on the complementary angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 interface, are, however, unlikely to sustain mouse infectivity on their own based on theoretical and experimental evidence to date. Our current understanding thus points to the Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Omicron variants of concern infecting mice, whereas Delta and “Delta Plus” lack a similar biomolecular basis to do so. This paper identifies 11 countries (Brazil, Chile, Djibouti, Haiti, Malawi, Mozambique, Reunion, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela) where targeted local field surveillance of mice is encouraged because they may have come in contact with humans who had the virus with adaptive mutation(s). It also provides a systematic methodology to analyze the potential for other animal reservoirs and their likely locations.

SARS-CoV-2 vaccinations were initially shown to substantially reduce risk of severe disease and death. However, pharmacokinetic (PK) waning and rapid viral evolution degrade neutralizing antibody (nAb) binding titers, causing loss of vaccinal protection. Additionally, there is inter-individual heterogeneity in the strength and durability of the vaccinal nAb response. Here, we propose a personalized booster strategy as a potential solution to this problem. Our model-based approach incorporates inter-individual heterogeneity in nAb response to primary SARS-CoV-2 vaccination into a pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic (PK/PD) model to project population-level heterogeneity in vaccinal protection. We further examine the impact of evolutionary immune evasion on vaccinal protection over time based on variant fold reduction in nAb potency. Our findings suggest viral evolution will decrease the effectiveness of vaccinal protection against severe disease, especially for individuals with a less durable immune response. More frequent boosting may restore vaccinal protection for individuals with a weaker immune response. Our analysis shows that the ECLIA RBD binding assay strongly predicts neutralization of sequence-matched pseudoviruses. This may be a useful tool for rapidly assessing individual immune protection. Our work suggests vaccinal protection against severe disease is not assured and identifies a potential path forward for reducing risk to immunologically vulnerable individuals.

Background: While the rapid deployment of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines had a significant impact on the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, rapid viral immune evasion and waning neutralizing antibody titers have degraded vaccine efficacy. Nevertheless, vaccine manufacturers and public health authorities have a number of options at their disposal to maximize the benefits of vaccination. In particular, the effect of booster schedules on vaccine performance bears further study. Methods: To better understand the effect of booster schedules on vaccine performance, we used an agent-based modeling framework and a population pharmacokinetic model to simulate the impact of boosting frequency on the durability of vaccine protection against infection and severe acute disease. Results: Our work suggests that repeated dosing at frequent intervals (three or more times a year) may offset the degradation of vaccine efficacy, preserving the utility of vaccines in managing the ongoing pandemic. Conclusions: Given the practical significance of potential improvements in vaccine utility, clinical research to better understand the effects of repeated vaccination would be highly impactful. These findings are particularly relevant as public health authorities worldwide have reduced the frequency of boosters to once a year or less.

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has produced five variants of concern (VOC) to date. The important spike mutation ‘N501Y’ is common to Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Omicron VOC, while the ‘P681R’ is key to Delta’s spread. We have analysed circa 10 million SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences from the world’s largest repository, ‘Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID)’, and demonstrated that these two mutations have co-occurred on the spike ‘D614G’ mutation background at least 5767 times from 12 May 2020 to 28 April 2022. In contrast, the Y501-H681 combination, which is common to Alpha and Omicron VOC, is present in circa 1.1 million entries. Over half of the 5767 co-occurrences were in France, Turkey, or US (East Coast), and the rest across 88 other countries; 36.1%, 3.9%, and 4.1% of the co-occurrences were Alpha’s Q.4, Gamma’s P.1.8, and Omicron’s BA.1.1 sub-lineages acquiring the P681R; 4.6% and 3.0% were Delta’s AY.5.7 sub-lineage and B.1.617.2 lineage acquiring the N501Y; the remaining 8.2% were in other variants. Despite the selective advantages individually conferred by N501Y and P681R, the Y501-R681 combination counterintuitively did not outcompete other variants in every instance we have examined. While this is a relief to worldwide public health efforts, in vitro and in vivo studies are urgently required in the absence of a strong in silico explanation for this phenomenon. This study demonstrates a pipeline to analyse combinations of key mutations from public domain information in a systematic manner and provide early warnings of spread. The study here demonstrates the usage of the pipeline using the key mutations N501Y, P681R, and D614G of SARS-CoV-2.

In the originally published version of this manuscript, the article received date was listed as October 31, 2021 in error. The correct article history is as follows: “Received: August 4, 2021. Revised: October 31, 2021. Accepted: November 21, 2021.” This error has been corrected.