Problems such as the reduction of the added value of agricultural products and the interruption of the supply of agricultural products caused by the unstable collaborative relationship have seriously hindered the high-quality development of the agricultural product supply chain. Promoting the stable collaboration in the agricultural product supply chain is an urgent problem. Considering the characteristic demand of consumers for agricultural products, this paper takes the supply chain mainly operating characteristic agricultural products and dominated by farmer cooperatives as the research object and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of farmer cooperatives, manufacturers, and retailers. We study the supply chain collaboration mechanism from the main strategy choice and the specific factors affecting its strategy choice. The results show that farmer cooperatives implement a strict supervision strategy and increase the reward and punishment to promote the collaboration in the supply chain, but the increase in supervision cost is not conducive to the income of farmer cooperatives. In the case of loose supervision, the difference between the additional income and the collaboration input is higher than the “free-rider” income obtained when adopting a non-collaboration strategy, which is conducive to its evolution towards collaboration. In addition, increasing additional income, improving synergy coefficient, and reducing collaboration input and “free-rider” income will increase the probability of the system evolving to Pareto optimal, and accelerate the realization of comprehensive collaboration in the agricultural product supply chain dominated by farmer cooperatives. The research results provide a certain supplement to the related research on agricultural product supply chains in theory, and provide a reference for the comprehensive collaboration of the agricultural product supply chain dominated by farmer cooperatives in practice.

The pricing strategy of agricultural products not only affects the product demand and purchasing behavior of consumers, but also the income distribution of node enterprises and the overall profit of the agricultural supply chain. This paper studies the pricing strategy of the agricultural product supply chain with farmer cooperatives as the core enterprise. Considering the heterogeneous demand of consumers, this paper introduces the degree of agricultural product characteristics and establishes a dynamic pricing model for agricultural products under decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making and designs a revenue sharing coordination contract. The results indicate that the overall profit of the supply chain obtained by pricing agricultural products through a decentralized decision-making model is lower than that created under centralized decision-making. Improving the degree of agricultural product’s characteristics and adopting the revenue sharing contract is conducive to the Pareto improvement of supply members. The relevant recommendations provide a reference for the product pricing strategy of this type of agricultural product supply chain.

Sustainable agricultural development relies significantly on the high-quality progression of farmers’ cooperatives. While growing in number, farmers’ cooperatives are still facing the dilemma of improving the quality of their development. Land endowment is the foundation of agricultural production and the farmers’ cooperatives. Clarifying the correlation between arable land scale and the high-quality development of farmers’ cooperatives is conducive to the optimization of land use and the adoption of scientific land management measures to improve the quality of the development of farmers’ cooperatives. Based on the micro-survey data of 448 farmers’ cooperatives in three major grain-producing provinces, namely Heilongjiang, Henan, and Shandong in China, this paper constructs an evaluation index system for the high-quality development of farmers’ cooperatives and theoretically and empirically explores the impact mechanism of arable land scale on the high-quality development of farmers’ cooperatives. The results suggest the following: (1) there exists a significant “inverted U-shaped” association between the arable land scale and the development quality of cooperatives, and this result remains robust after testing through substitution variable and instrumental variable methods; (2) further research on the “inverted U-shaped” association reveals that the impact of arable land scale on the high-quality development of cooperatives undergoes four stages: “weak impact—rapid improvement—diminished growth effect—decline in development quality”; and (3) mechanism tests suggest that the “inverted U-shaped” association between the arable land scale and the development quality of cooperatives is mainly constrained by industrial development input, and arable land scale and industrial development show a strong complementary relationship. Therefore, in the course of enhancing the quality of farmers’ cooperatives, it is crucial to select appropriate land management strategies based on to their stage, paying special attention to the compatibility between arable land scale and industrial development.