WU QUN

Dr. WU QUN


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 August 2021 in Environmental Science and Pollution Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
WCWende Chen
Wende Chen
KZkun zhu
kun zhu
WQWU QUN
WU QUN
YCYankun Cai
Yankun Cai
YLYutian Lu
Yutian Lu
JWJun Wei
Jun Wei

4 March 2024 in Journal of Banking & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HAHeng An
Heng An
VBVigdis Boasson
Vigdis Boasson
LLLijun Lei
Lijun Lei
WQWU QUN
WU QUN


29 October 2012 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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Preprint
Open access
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BJBradford D. Jordan
Bradford D. Jordan
MLMark H. Liu
Mark H. Liu
WQWU QUN
WU QUN
Using a sample of U.S. firms from 1995 to 2002, we examine corporate payout policy in dual-class firms. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out less to shareholders because entrenched managers want to maximize the value of assets under control and the private benefits associated with it. The pre-commitment hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out more to shareholders because firms use corporate payouts as a pre-commitment device to mitigate agency costs. Our results support the pre-commitment hypothesis. Dual-class firms have higher cash dividend payments and total payouts, and use more regular cash dividends rather than special dividends or repurchases, compared to single-class firms. Dual-class firms with severe free cash flow problems and few growth opportunities rely even more on corporate payouts as a pre-commitment mechanism. We also rule out the alternative hypothesis that dual-class firms pay out more because super-voting shareholders lack the ability to generate home-made dividends by selling shares since super-voting shares are non-tradable.

1 November 2007 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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Preprint
Open access
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TCThomas J. Chemmanur
Thomas J. Chemmanur
BJBradford D. Jordan
Bradford D. Jordan
MLMark H. Liu
Mark H. Liu
WQWU QUN
WU QUN
We empirically analyze the rationale for adopting anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) by examining how ATPs affect corporate spin-offs. We find that firms protected by more ATPs before spin-offs have higher abnormal announcement returns and greater improvement in post-spin-off operating performance than firms with fewer ATPs. Further, firms that reduce the number of ATPs after spin-offs have greater improvement in operating performance than firms that do not reduce the number of ATPs. The CEO of the pre-spin-off firm tends to retain more ATPs in the parent firm and assign fewer ATPs to the spun-off unit if he remains as the CEO of the parent but not the spun-off unit. Our results indicate that the value gains to spin-offs are at least partly due to the reduction in management entrenchment associated with ATPs.

11 December 2013 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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Preprint
Open access
PDF file
BJBradford D. Jordan
Bradford D. Jordan
MLMark H. Liu
Mark H. Liu
WQWU QUN
WU QUN
We examine how organizational structure affects corporate payout policies. Conglomerates (multi-segment firms) pay out more than pure plays (single-segment firms) in both cash dividends and total payouts (defined as cash dividends plus share repurchases). Further, corporate payouts increase as the cross-segment correlation (cash flow or investment) in a conglomerate decreases. The above effects are more pronounced for regular cash dividends than for special cash dividends or stock repurchases. To address the endogeneity issues, we also examine corporate payout changes around M&As. Corporate payouts increase after M&As, especially among M&As in which acquirers and targets are less correlated (earnings or investments). The results suggest that retaining earnings to keep financial slack is an important consideration when firms make corporate payout decisions.