Markus Brede

Dr. Markus Brede

Electronics and Computer Science (FPAS), University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

26Years (2001-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 September 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
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Journal Article
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EZEfstathios Zavvos
Efstathios Zavvos
Enrico GerdingEnrico Gerding
Enrico Gerding
MBMarkus Brede
Markus Brede
En-route charging stations are essential to ensure the adoption of electric vehicles. However, careful planning is necessary due to high cost in infrastructure and potentially long waiting queues. Existing literature on the placement of charging stations largely disregards competition, sets prices to cover costs and/or disregards queues. In contrast, this work models competing station investors who aim to maximise expected profit, while electric vehicle drivers aim to minimise expected travel costs including queues. Following a game-theoretic approach, investors strategically decide station capacities, locations and charging unit power outputs as well as fees, taking into consideration building and operational costs. Given the complexity of the problem, the solution involves a combination of theoretical and algorithmic techniques to obtain subgame-perfect equilibria of investor and driver choices. Subgame-perfect equilibria are found to be at least 92.85% efficient, for reasonable fluctuations of problem parameters. Furthermore, it is found that charging prices can be up to approximately 5 times higher than marginal cost due to long charging times, and also that better charging technology may not necessarily benefit drivers in the near future. Finally, subsidies towards the purchase of charging units are shown to be beneficial for both drivers and investors, being able to generate up to 14.3% additional value than the cost of the subsidy. In contrast, subsidies on the energy price for stations are found to have small effect and can be abused by investors.

1 January 2019 in Complexity
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MBMarkus Brede
Markus Brede
In this paper we study the impact of active participation, or deliberately seeking out other agents with an aim of convincing them, on the dynamics of consensus formation. For this purpose, we propose an adaptive network model in which two processes shape opinion dynamics at interwoven time‐scales as follows: (i) agents adapt their opinions subject to influence from social network neighbours who hold opinions within a tolerance interval δ and (ii) agents rewire network connections with an aim of maximizing their own influence on overall system opinion. We study this system both in an endogenous setting, in which all agents are subject to influence and also attempt to maximize influence, and in a setting of exogenous control, in which external agents not subject to influence adaptively attempt to maximize their influence. In both settings we find three regimes of stationary opinion configurations: (i) for low δ a regime of two evenly balanced radicalized opinion clusters at the extremes of the opinion space, (ii) for intermediate δ a ’winner‐takes‐most’ regime of two unevenly sized radicalized opinion clusters, and (iii) for large δ a regime in which very low spread compromise consensus states can be reached. Comparing to adaptive processes of random and deliberately spread‐reducing rewiring, we demonstrate that in regime (iii) competitive influence maximization can achieve near‐minimal opinion spread within near‐optimal times. Further, we also show that competitive influence maximizing rewiring can reduce the impact of small influential minorities on consensus states.

11 February 2013 in PLOS ONE
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MBMarkus Brede
Markus Brede
In this paper I investigate the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma when individuals change their strategies subject to performance evaluation of their neighbours over variable time horizons. In the monochrome setting, in which all agents per default share the same performance evaluation rule, weighing past events strongly dramatically enhances the prevalence of cooperators. For co-evolutionary models, in which evaluation time horizons and strategies can co-evolve, I demonstrate that cooperation naturally associates with long-term evaluation of others while defection is typically paired with very short time horizons. Moreover, considering the continuous spectrum in between enhanced and discounted weights of past performance, cooperation is optimally supported when cooperators neither give enhanced weight to past nor more recent events, but simply average payoffs. Payoff averaging is also found to emerge as the dominant strategy for cooperators in co-evolutionary models, thus proposing a natural route to the evolution of cooperation in viscous populations.

1 June 2020 in Journal of the Operational Research Society
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AKAlexander C. Kalloniatis
Alexander C. Kalloniatis
KHKeeley Hoek
Keeley Hoek
MZMathew Zuparic
Mathew Zuparic
MBMarkus Brede
Markus Brede
We present a generalisation of the classical Lanchester model for directed fire between two combat forces but now employing networks for the manoeuvre of Blue and Red forces, and the pattern of engagement between the two. The model therefore integrates fires between dispersed elements, as well as manoeuvre through an internal-to-each-side diffusive interaction. We explain the model with several simple examples, including cases where conservation laws hold. We then apply an optimisation approach where, for a fixed-in-structure adversary, we optimise the internal manoeuvre and external engagement structures where the trade-off between maximising damage on the adversary and minimising own-losses can be examined. In the space of combat outcomes this leads to a sequence of transitions from defeat to stalemate and then to victory for the force with optimised networks. Depending on the trade-off between destruction and self-preservation, the optimised networks develop a number of structures including the appearance of so-called sacrificial nodes, that may be interpreted as feints, manoeuvre hubs, and suppressive fires. We discuss these in light of Manoeuvre Warfare theory.

20 June 2001 in Physical Review E
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MBMarkus Brede
Markus Brede
UBUlrich Behn
Ulrich Behn
We investigate a model where idiotypes (characterizing B lymphocytes and antibodies of an immune system) and anti-idiotypes are represented by complementary bit strings of a given length d allowing for a number of mismatches (matching rules). In this model, the vertices of the hypercube in dimension d represent the potential repertoire of idiotypes. A random set of (with probability p) occupied vertices corresponds to the expressed repertoire of idiotypes at a given moment. Vertices of this set linked by the above matching rules build random clusters. We give a structural and statistical characterization of these clusters, or in other words of the architecture of the idiotypic network. Increasing the probability p one finds at a critical p a percolation transition where for the first time a large connected graph occurs with probability 1. Increasing p further, there is a second transition above which the repertoire is complete in the sense that any newly introduced idiotype finds a complementary anti-idiotype. We introduce structural characteristics such as the mass distribution and the fragmentation rate for random clusters, and determine the scaling behavior of the cluster size distribution near the percolation transition, including finite size corrections. We find that slightly above the percolation transition the large connected cluster (the central part of the idiotypic network) consists typically of one highly connected part and a number of weakly connected constituents and coexists with a number of small, isolated clusters. This is in accordance with the picture of a central and a peripheral part of the idiotypic network and gives some support to idealized architectures of the central part used in recent dynamical mean field models.

17 April 2018 in Frontiers in Robotics and AI
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MBMarkus Brede
Markus Brede
VRValerio Restocchi
Valerio Restocchi
SSSebastian Stein
Sebastian Stein
In this paper, we investigate influence maximization, or optimal opinion control, in a modified version of the two-state voter dynamics in which a native state and a controlled or influenced state are accounted for. We include agent predispositions to resist influence in the form of a probability q with which agents spontaneously switch back to the native state when in the controlled state. We argue that in contrast to the original voter model, optimal control in this setting depends on q: For low strength of predispositions q, optimal control should focus on hub nodes, but for large q, optimal control can be achieved by focusing on the lowest degree nodes. We investigate this transition between hub and low-degree node control for heterogeneous undirected networks and give analytical and numerical arguments for the existence of two control regimes.