Laura Gee

Prof. Laura Gee

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2018 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LGLaura Gee
Laura Gee
MSMichael J. Schreck
Michael J. Schreck

20 April 2018 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LGLaura Gee
Laura Gee
This paper presents the results from a 2.3-million-person field experiment that varies whether or not a job seeker sees the number of applicants for a job posting on a large job-posting website, LinkedIn. This intervention increases the likelihood that a person will finish an application by 3.5%. Women have a larger increase in their likelihood of finishing an application than men. Overall, adding this information to a job posting may offer a light-touch way to both increase application rates and alter the diversity of the applicant pool. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2994. This paper was accepted by John List, behavioral economics.

14 March 2015 in Experimental Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JAJames Andreoni
James Andreoni
LGLaura Gee
Laura Gee
When public goods can only be provided when donations cross a minimum threshold, this creates an advantage in that Pareto Efficient outcomes can be Nash Equilibria. Despite this, experiments have shown that groups struggle to coordinate on one of the many efficient equilibria. We apply a mechanism used successfully in continuous public goods games, the Hired Gun Mechanism (Andreoni and Gee in J. Public Econ. 96(11–12):1036–1046, 2012), to see if it can successfully get subjects across the threshold. When we use the mechanism to eliminate only inefficient equilibria, without addressing coordination, there is a modest but statistically insignificant improvement with the mechanism. However, when we hone the mechanism to eliminate all but one of the provision-point equilibria, thereby addressing the coordination issue, the mechanism moves all subjects to the desired efficient outcome almost immediately. In fact, after only one round using the hired gun mechanism, all subject are coordinating on the chosen equilibrium. The mechanism can be applied in settings where a group (1) has a plan for public good provision, (2) can measure contributions, (3) can fine members and (4) has an agreed upon standard for expected contributions. In these settings simple punishments, when focused on solving coordination as well as free riding, can greatly improve efficiency.

1 September 2020 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GDGregory DeAngelo
Gregory DeAngelo
LGLaura Gee
Laura Gee

1 September 2024 in Organization Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BCBo Cowgill
Bo Cowgill
AAAmanda Agan
Amanda Agan
LGLaura Gee
Laura Gee
This study investigates whether the success of salary history bans could be limited by job-seekers volunteering their salaries unprompted. We survey American workers in 2019 and 2021 about their recent job searches, distinguishing when candidates were asked about salary history from when they were not. Historically well-paid workers may have an incentive to disclose, and employers who are aware of this could infer that nondisclosing workers are concealing low salaries. Through this mechanism, all workers could face pressure to avoid the stigma of silence. Our data shows a large percentage of workers (28%) volunteer salary history, even when a ban prevents employers from asking. An additional 47% will disclose if enough other job candidates disclose. Men are more likely than women to disclose their salaries unprompted, especially if they believe other candidates are disclosing. Over our 1.5-year sample covering jurisdictions with (and without) bans, unprompted volunteering of salary histories increased by about 6–8 percentage points. Funding: This work was supported by W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation (Emerging Scholars Program). Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.17384 .

31 December 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
LGLaura Gee
Laura Gee
JMJonathan Meer
Jonathan Meer
TBTricia Bromley
Tricia Bromley
VDValerie Dao
Valerie Dao
CEChristine L. Exley
Christine L. Exley
JKJudd B. Kessler
Judd B. Kessler