Side-channel attacks represent a realistic and serious threat to the security of embedded devices for already almost three decades. A variety of attacks and targets they can be applied to have been introduced, and while the area of side-channel attacks and their mitigation is very well-researched, it is yet to be consolidated. Deep learning-based side-channel attacks entered the field in recent years with the promise of more competitive performance and enlarged attackers’ capabilities compared to other techniques. At the same time, the new attacks bring new challenges and complexities to the domain, making the systematization of knowledge (SoK) even more critical. We first dissect deep learning-based side-channel attacks according to the different phases they can be used in and map those phases to the efforts conducted so far in the domain. For each phase, we identify the weaknesses and challenges that triggered the known open problems. We also connect the attacks to the threat models and evaluate their advantages and drawbacks. Finally, we provide a number of recommendations to be followed in deep learning-based side-channel attacks.

Boolean functions are mathematical objects used in diverse domains and have been actively researched for several decades already. One domain where Boolean functions play an important role is cryptography. There, the plethora of settings one should consider and cryptographic properties that need to be fulfilled makes the search for new Boolean functions still a very active domain. There are several options to construct appropriate Boolean functions: algebraic constructions, random search, and metaheuristics. In this work, we concentrate on metaheuristic approaches and examine the related works appearing in the last 25 years. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first survey work on this topic. Additionally, we provide a new taxonomy of related works and discuss the results obtained. Finally, we finish this survey with potential future research directions.

The aim of this paper is to find cellular automata (CA) rules that are used to describe S-boxes with good cryptographic properties and low implementation cost. Up to now, CA rules have been used in several ciphers to define an S-box, but in all those ciphers, the same CA rule is used. This CA rule is best known as the one defining the Keccak χ transformation. Since there exists no straightforward method for constructing CA rules that define S-boxes with good cryptographic/implementation properties, we use a special kind of heuristics for that -- Genetic Programming (GP). Although it is not possible to theoretically prove the efficiency of such a method, our experimental results show that GP is able to find a large number of CA rules that define good S-boxes in a relatively easy way. We focus on the 4 x 4 and 5 x 5 sizes and we implement the S-boxes in hardware to examine implementation properties like latency, area, and power. Particularly interesting is the internal encoding of the solutions in the considered heuristics using combinatorial circuits; this makes it easy to approximate S-box implementation properties like latency and area a priori.