Lifan Yang

Lifan Yang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 March 2023 in Journal of Cleaner Production
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LYLifan Yang
Lifan Yang
YWYan Wang
Yan Wang
WZWuyi Zhang
Wuyi Zhang
ZTZhengzhou Tan
Zhengzhou Tan
AUAnwar Syed Umair
Anwar Syed Umair


9 January 2024 in Heliyon
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Sen LiuSen Liu
Sen Liu
LWLei Wang
Lei Wang
XSXuejiang Shi
Xuejiang Shi
SOShibo Ouyang
Shibo Ouyang
LYLifan Yang
Lifan Yang
The quality of primary products in a supply chain is determined by the agent and the principal. Simultaneously, there are quota production constraints on the principals. Our discourse centers on the design of incentive contracts for agents within these supply chains. We derived the parameters describing the contract, level of effort, profits for both sides, and the minimum requirements of the principal for the proportion of high-quality primary products. This study compares the decision-making paradigms of agents and principals in various contexts. The results show that decision-making mechanisms are strongly influenced by individual effort costs, various internal and external organizational variables, and the interplay of efforts on both sides. Using numerical experiments, we investigate the effects of different situations between clients and contractors on contracting and effort strategies. The results show that when the agent exerts unilateral effort, reasonable incentive contracts can spur the agent to increase effort and thus increase the proportion of high-quality primary products. In the case of bilateral efforts, a well-calibrated contract design benefits the agent (bearing less risk). For the principal, the expected profit increases in most cases. When considering the quota production, it is necessary to set an appropriate limit on the proportion of high-quality primary products.

1 January 2022 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
LYLifan Yang
Lifan Yang
YSYinyuan Si
Yinyuan Si
Sen LiuSen Liu
Sen Liu
DYDan Yang
Dan Yang
Considering the uncertainty of the amount of recycled material in symbiotic supply chains, this paper concentrates on the price and quantity decisions of members in symbiotic supply chains and the resulting economic and environmental impacts. We derive optimal solutions for the manufacturer and the symbiotic supplier. In addition, we obtain conditions for different degrees of symbiosis by comparing various decisions. Our analysis suggests that the decisions of all stakeholders are affected by a combination of effective purchasing costs per unit and factors internal and external to the enterprise. That is, both technology and markets influence the level of symbiosis. A complete symbiosis model is established when the unit effective purchase cost of the recycled material is lower than the price of the original raw material. If not, a partial symbiosis model is established. Furthermore, through sensitivity and comparative analysis, we find that the price of recycled materials, the number of orders, and the profitability of each party in the symbiotic supply chain are influenced by the symbiotic model and external conditions. Finally, symbiotic cooperation does not necessarily reduce the total environmental impact but generally reduces the environmental impact per unit of production in the symbiotic supply chain. Through numerical experiments, we further investigated the impact of different game situations between the symbiotic supplier and supplier on sourcing and pricing strategies. The results show that the manufacturer benefits regardless of the game scenario compared to when the raw material price is at a stationary level. On the supply-side, the supplier is in a more advantageous position in Bertrand game, and henceforth the symbiotic supplier is in Stackelberg game.