In previous work we have shown that in Britain and Sweden alike parental class, parental status and parental education have independent effects on individuals’ educational attainment. In this paper we extend our analyses, first by also including measures of individuals’ early-life cognitive ability, and second by bringing our results for Britain and Sweden into direct comparative form. On the basis of extensive birth-cohort data for both countries, we find that when cognitive ability is introduced into our analyses, parental class, status and education continue to have significant, and in fact only moderately reduced and largely persisting, effects on the educational attainment of members of successive cohorts. There is some limited evidence for Britain, but not for Sweden, that cognitive ability has a declining effect on educational attainment, and a further cross-national difference is that in Britain, but not in Sweden, some positive interaction effects occur between advantaged social origins and high cognitive ability in relation to educational success. Overall, though, cross-national similarities are most apparent, and especially in the extent to which parental class, status and education, when taken together, create wide disparities in the eventual educational attainment of individuals who in early life were placed at similar levels of cognitive ability. Some wider implications of these findings are considered.
We investigate claims originating in the work of Daniel Bell that in post-industrial societies, educational qualifications obtained prior to labour market entry increasingly determine individuals’ class positions—while opportunities for achieving upward class mobility over the course of working life correspondingly diminish. We apply optimal matching techniques of sequence analysis as a basis for constructing typologies of class histories for men and women in three British birth cohorts, whose lives span the period from the mid-twentieth to the early twenty-first century. We find a steady increase across the cohorts in class histories characterized by entry into, and stability within, managerial and professional positions and associated with relatively high levels of qualification. However, there is no decline in class histories characterized by upward mobility; and, while there are clear associations between education and most types of class history that we distinguish, the effects of education are systematically and persistently reinforced, or modified, by the independent effects of early life cognitive ability and of class origins. In Britain at least, there is little indication of movement towards an education-based meritocracy, and educational level at labour market entry is today no more class destiny than it was half a century ago.
A large body of often rather complex findings on intergenerational social mobility has by now come into existence but theoretical development has not kept pace. In this paper, focusing specifically on class mobility in European nations and the US, we aim, first of all, to identify the main empirical regularities that have emerged from research, making the now standard distinction between absolute and relative mobility. Next, we review previous theories of mobility, leading up to what we label as the liberal theory, and we note the difficulties now evident with the latter, associated with its functionalist basis. We then set out our own theory of intergenerational class mobility, grounded in the subjectively rational courses of action followed by the various actors involved. We seek to show how the empirical regularities described can in this way be accounted for, while pointing to additional evidence that supports the theory but also to ways in which it is open to further empirical test. Finally, we consider some more general implications of the theory and, on this basis, venture a number of – conditional – predictions on the future of class mobility in more advanced societies.
We aim to bring together two current strands of research into inequalities in individuals’ educational attainment that are associated with their social origins: that concerned with the “primary” and “secondary” effects of social origins in creating inequalities, and that concerned with the relation between these inequalities and different components of social origins, taken to represent different forms of parental resources. Our main findings are the following. The secondary effects of social origins—their effects via the educational choices that young people make given their prior academic performance—are clearly operative across five key educational transitions within the English educational system. More specifically, we estimate that 35% of the total effect of social origins is secondary in the earliest transition that we consider, and from 15% to 20% in the subsequent four. Furthermore, mediation analyses reveal that secondary effects are most strongly associated with parental education and then, to a lesser degree with parental status, while little association exists with parental class and none at all with parental income. Primary effects are also at all transitions most strongly associated with parental education and status but in this case both parental class and parental income do retain some importance. We suggest an explanation for our empirical findings as resulting largely from the concern of highly educated, professional parents, and their children to avoid the occurrence of downward intergenerational mobility, especially in terms of education and status.
While accepting that an inverse relation of some kind exists between inequality and mobility, we begin by reviewing criticisms of recent attempts by economists to express this relation in terms of income inequality and mobility – the ‘Great Gatsby Curve’. This appears to be neither empirically secure nor theoretically well-grounded. Using a newly constructed European dataset, we then aim to show that if mobility is treated in terms of social class, rather than income, an inverse relation with social inequality can be suggested that is more complex but that has a stronger empirical and a more coherent theoretical basis. Our results indicate that European countries are best seen not as displaying entirely continuous variation in their relative rates of class mobility, but rather as falling into a number of comparatively high and low fluidity groups. We offer an interpretation of these results that starts out from the proposition that within societies with a capitalist market economy, a nuclear family system and a liberal democratic polity, some limit exists to the extent to which relative mobility rates can be brought towards equality. Variation in such rates can then be understood in terms of how close nations are to this limit, and whether they are moving towards or receding from it, but with different forms of inequality impacting on their fluidity trajectories in differing ways.