Takao Kato

Prof. Takao Kato

Department of Economics, Colgate University, Hamilton, NY 13346, USA
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

33Years (1994-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 July 2016 in ILR Review
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Journal Article
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RKRyo Kambayashi
Ryo Kambayashi
Takao KatoTakao Kato
Takao Kato
The authors document and contrast changes (or lack thereof) in job stability over the past 25 years between Japan and the United States. Prime-age male workers with at least five years of tenure in Japan continued to enjoy much higher job stability than did their U.S. counterparts. Most remarkably, Japan’s “Lost Decade” had little discernible adverse effect on the job stability of this group of Japanese employees. By contrast, job stability for mid-career hires and youth workers deteriorated in Japan. The authors’ cross-national regression analysis of job loss confirms the consistently more important role that seniority plays in protecting workers from job loss in Japan than in the United States and reveals that this gap in seniority’s influence on job stability between the two countries widened. Overall, it is the U.S. economy with the longest economic expansion, not the Japanese economy with the longest economic stagnation, that experienced deteriorating job stability, pointing to the absence of convergence of the Japanese and U.S. systems.

1 August 2017 in The Economic Journal
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Journal Article
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AFAnders Frederiksen
Anders Frederiksen
Takao KatoTakao Kato
Takao Kato

16 November 2010 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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SASaioa Arando
Saioa Arando
Mónica GagoMónica Gago
Mónica Gago
Takao KatoTakao Kato
Takao Kato
DJDerek C. Jones
Derek C. Jones
FFFred Freundlich
Fred Freundlich
By drawing on new interview evidence gathered during several field trips and new financial and economic data from both external and internal sources, we document and assess the changing economic importance and performance of the Mondragon group of cooperatives as well as the two largest sectors within the group. Compared to conventional firms in the Basque Country and Spain, and producer co-ops (PCs) and employee owned firms elsewhere, in general we find evidence of growing group importance and strong performance and a similarly strong record for the industrial and retail divisions. These stylized facts do not support hypotheses concerning PCs such as predictions that PCs will restrict employment and become progressively comparatively under-capitalized. In accounting for this record, we highlight key and, at times, not uncontroversial institutional developments in the group during the last 20 years or so that indicate the existence of a continuing capacity for institutional adaptation in Mondragon - an ongoing ability to innovate and make institutional adjustments to deal with emerging challenges. In addition, we provide more detailed information than before on some key distinguishing institutional mechanisms of the Mondragon group, including the extent of worker-member transfers during economic crises, the patterns of profit pooling and the type and volume of training. The aggressive and extensive use of these and related mechanisms, themselves formulated and refined only after a deliberative democratic process, may help to account for some of the outstanding features of the Mondragon group record. Overall these findings represent suggestive evidence that groups of employee-owned firms are feasible and sustainable organizational forms; in a world of declining labor power and tepid employment recovery by private firms, the institutional arrangements at Mondragon are worthy of deeper study by many including policymakers, other co-ops and other employee-owned firms.

22 December 2010 in Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
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KBKiu-Sik Bae
Kiu-Sik Bae
HCHiroyuki Chuma
Hiroyuki Chuma
Takao KatoTakao Kato
Takao Kato
DKDong-Bae Kim
Dong-Bae Kim
IOIsao Ohashi
Isao Ohashi

20 July 2016 in ILR Review
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Journal Article
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DJDerek C. Jones
Derek C. Jones
PKPanu Kalmi
Panu Kalmi
Takao KatoTakao Kato
Takao Kato
MMMikko Mäkinen
Mikko Mäkinen
The authors investigate whether productivity is greater if firms use employee involvement (EI) in decision making and financial participation (FP) as complementary practices. Based on representative panel data from Finnish manufacturing firms, the study uses diverse specifications to examine different theoretical explanations of the productivity effects of complementarities. The authors find virtually no evidence to support the theory of complementarities when EI and FP are simply measured by their incidence. They do find some evidence for complementarities using cross-sectional data (controlling for several covariates that related work has found to be important for firm performance) and also when analyses use measures of the intensity of FP. In accounting for differences in empirical findings across varying settings, the findings suggest that outcomes depend on the institutional context and are sensitive to variation in measurement and analytical methods.

1 January 2004 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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Takao KatoTakao Kato
Takao Kato
CLCheryl X. Long
Cheryl X. Long
This paper provides evidence on how executive compensation relates to firm performance in listed firms in China. Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on executive compensation, ownership structure and board characteristics, we find for the first time statistically significant sensitivities and elasticities of annual cash compensation (salary and bonus) for top executives with respect to shareholder value in China. In addition, sales growth is shown to be significantly linked to executive compensation and that Chinese executives are penalized for making negative profit although they are neither penalized for declining profit nor rewarded for rising profit insofar as it is positive. Perhaps more importantly, we find that ownership structure of China's listed firms has important effects on pay-performance link in these firms: (i) state ownership of China's listed firms is weakening pay-performance link for top managers and thus possibly making China's listed firms less effective in solving the agency problem; (ii) such effects exist for both direct government ownership through state shares and indirect government ownership through legal person shares and indirect ownership of listed firms by the state may weaken pay-performance link more than direct state ownership; and (iii) corporate governance reform measures such as the promotion of independent directorship and the separation of the CEO position from the board chairmanship are ineffective in making pay-performance link stronger. As such, ownership restructuring may be needed for China to successfully transform its SOEs to efficient modernized corporations and reform its overall economy.