This paper provides an original account of global land, water, and nitrogen use in support of industrialized livestock production and trade, with emphasis on two of the fastest-growing sectors, pork and poultry. Our analysis focuses on trade in feed and animal products, using a new model that calculates the amount of “virtual” nitrogen, water, and land used in production but not embedded in the product. We show how key meat-importing countries, such as Japan, benefit from “virtual” trade in land, water, and nitrogen, and how key meat-exporting countries, such as Brazil, provide these resources without accounting for their true environmental cost. Results show that Japan's pig and chicken meat imports embody the virtual equivalent of 50% of Japan's total arable land, and half of Japan's virtual nitrogen total is lost in the US. Trade links with China are responsible for 15% of the virtual nitrogen left behind in Brazil due to feed and meat exports, and 20% of Brazil's area is used to grow soybean ...

El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) events exert significant influence on Southeast Asian rice output and markets. This paper measures ENSO effects on Indonesia's national and regional rice production and on world rice prices, using the August Niño 3.4 sea surface temperature anomaly (SSTA) to gauge climate variability. It shows that each degree Celsius change in the August SSTA produces a 1,318,000 metric ton effect on output and a $21/metric ton change in the world price for lower quality rice. Of the inter-annual production changes due to SSTA variation, 90% occur within 12 provinces, notably Java and South Sulawesi. New data and models offer opportunities to understand the agricultural effects of ENSO events, to reach early consensus on coming ENSO effects, and to use forecasting to improve agencies' and individuals' capacity to mitigate climate effects on food security. We propose that Indonesia hold an ‘ENSO summit’ each September to analyse the food-security implications of upcoming climate events.

Land-clearing forest fires in Indonesia cause enormous private and social losses in the form of greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, habitat destruction, worsened human health, and strained international relations. These fires are almost always deliberately set, often (but not always) by smallholders as they seek to expand farm size. The Government of Indonesia has taken primarily a regulatory approach to preventing these fires by imposing bans and making them illegal. This paper studies an alternative approach, explored in part through a large policy experiment focused instead on the use of positive financial incentives. We first summarize our 275-village randomized control (RCT) policy experiment from 4 fire-prone districts in West Kalimantan. These results showed no effects on fire outcomes from a conditional cash payment, even though there were some changes in behavior. The article then draws on survey results and other published documents to explain qualitatively why the results occurred. We argue that climate variation, government policy on decentralization, population density, and accidents appear to explain fire outcomes among villages more than did the opportunity to “win” a conditional payment of USD 10,800. Fundamentally, this sum did not compete with the high net present value of land for growing oil palm. The high net present value appeared to prove irresistible to a small percentage of villagers, despite the illegality of using fire to clear forested margins. More generally, this article provides a broad, cautionary understanding of why policies that only use conditional payments to prevent fires are unlikely to be successful in Indonesia’s oil palm regions.