Although there are many articles on carbon emission reduction of sustainable supply chain, most of them study the carbon emission reduction efficiency of supply chain in the case of single carbon policy or demand determination. Based on previous studies, this paper considered a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer in an uncertain demand market. The effects of demand randomness and different carbon policies on carbon emission reduction level and optimal decision in supply chain were studied by constructing mean-variance utility function and Stackelberg game. Due to the difficulty of data acquisition, this paper verified the equalization results by numerical simulation. The results show that: (1) cap-and-trade policy, government subsidy policy and carbon tax policy can promote the carbon emission reduction investment of supply chain, while carbon tax policy will lead to the decline of the overall profit of supply chain; (2) For the manufacturer and the retailer, adopting a strategy with a low degree of risk avoidance will increase its own profits; (3) For the supply chain as a whole, it is more advantageous for manufacturers to adopt higher risk avoidance strategies, while retailers to adopt lower risk avoidance strategies. In addition, in the conclusion, this paper puts forward management implications related to stakeholders, thus providing help for the development of sustainable supply chain.
This paper discusses the impact of government intervention (greenness threshold limit) and cap-and-trade policy on green investment, stakeholder profits and social welfare under different power structure scenarios in the green supply chain. First, a two-level green supply chain system is constructed: a manufacturer that produces green products and complies with cap-and-trade policies and a retailer that sells green products. Based on the Stackelberg game and Cournot game, we compare the optimal solutions under the government intervention mechanism and cap-and-trade mechanism with manufacturer leadership, retailer leadership and equal power. The results are as follows: (1) both government intervention and the cap-and-trade mechanism are conducive to an increase in green technology innovation and profit, but excessive control will lead to a decline in social welfare. (2) The results in the concentrated scenario were better than those in the dispersed scenario. In the decentralized state, the result of equal power is the best, the result of retailer leadership is next, and the result of manufacturer leadership is the worst. (3) The lower cost of green investment will cause enterprises to give up purchasing carbon emission permits from the carbon market.
In today’s complex market competition environment, a high quality and high level of service plays a critical role in obtaining and maintaining long-term sustainable competitive advantage for enterprises and supply chains. Considering the service negative spillover effect, this paper investigates the horizontal Stackelberg competition and optimal service decision in two competing manufacturer-led supply chains. Four competitive structure models are constructed and the corresponding equilibrium solutions are obtained. By comparing the equilibrium results of four different structures, it is found that the service negative spillover effect and competition between supply chains have negative incentive effect on service providers and their supply chains. However, the chain-to-chain competition will benefit the supply chain that does not provide services from free-riding effect, which will be intensified with the intensification of competition. In addition, from the perspective of supply chain network and externality, we find that when the structure of one supply chain remains fixed and the other changes from centralized to decentralized, there will be a “double marginalization” effect. At the same time, the structural change from centralized to decentralized has certain “altruism”, that is, positive network externality, so as to improve the rival’s performance significantly.
This paper investigates the horizontal Nash game and structure selection strategy in two competing dominant enterprises. Each firm decides whether to outsource the retail or manufacture to the exclusive third-party enterprise and thus forms a decentralized supply chain structure. On the premise that third-party enterprises have no advantage on sales and manufacture cost, the revenue-sharing contract is introduced between the manufacturer and retailer, and the influence of decentralized structure on the game equilibrium structure and supply chain profit is analyzed based on Hotelling model. The results show that, when compared with centralized structure, decentralized supply chain has the structural advantage to improving not only its supply chain profits but also the competing chain. This interesting insight is counterintuitive to the common “double marginalization” effect and explains the outsourcing strategy from the perspective of supply chain competition. In addition, we find the dominant strategy in the evolutionary game is that both two chains are decentralized or integrated.
While carbon emissions reduction brings about environmental benefits, it can also create financial pressure on many manufacturing enterprises. Many manufacturing enterprises have begun to pledge their own carbon emissions right quotas for financing and the funds from this financing are being used to implement energy savings and emissions reduction strategies. To investigate the impact of carbon emissions right pledge financing on supply chains, this study constructed a two-echelon low-carbon supply chain, which consisted of a capital-constrained manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer invested in carbon reduction technologies using carbon emissions right pledge financing. On this basis, we analyzed the carbon emissions reduction levels and profits of the supply chain in three different power structures. The results showed that the manufacturer pledged the most carbon emissions rights to finance emissions reduction in the Nash model and, in this case, the carbon emissions reduction levels and profits of the supply chain were always the highest. In the manufacturer-led Stackelberg model, the overall economic and environmental benefits of the supply chain were the lowest. In addition, we analyzed the sensitivity of the important parameters of the model and revealed some management implications.