The recent emergence of Near Field Communication (NFC) enabled smart phones resulted in an increasing interest in NFC security. Several new attack scenarios, using NFC devices either as attack platform or as device under attack, have been discovered. One of them is the software-based relay attack. In this paper we evaluate the feasibility of the software-based relay attack in an existing mobile contactless payment system. We give an in-depth analysis of Google Wallet's credit card payment functionality. We describe our prototypical relay system that we used to successfully mount the software-based relay attack on Google Wallet. We discuss the practicability and threat potential of the attack and provide several possible workarounds. Finally, we analyze Google's approach to solving the issue of software-based relay attacks in their recent releases of Google Wallet.
Near Field Communication's card emulation mode is a way to put virtual smart cards into mobile phones. A recently launched application is Google Wallet. Google Wallet turns a phone into a credit card, a prepaid card and a tool to collect gift certificates and discounts. Card emulation mode uses dedicated smart card chips, which are considered to fulfill high security standards. Therefore, card emulation mode is also considered to be safe and secure. However, an NFC-enabled mobile phone introduces a significantly different threat vector. Especially a mobile phone's permanent connectivity to a global network and the possibility to install arbitrary applications onto smart phones open up for several new attack scenarios. This paper gives an overview of the new risks imposed by mobile connectivity and untrusted mobile phone applications. The various APIs for secure element access on different mobile phone platforms and their access control mechanisms are analyzed. The security aspects of mobile phones are explained. Finally, two practical attack scenarios, a method to perform a denial of service (DoS) attack against a secure element and a method to remotely use the applications on a victims secure element without the victim's knowledge, are highlighted.
The NFC Forum has released a first candidate for their Signature Record Type Definition. This specification adds digital signatures to the NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF), which is a standardized format for storing formatted data on NFC (Near Field Communication) tags and for transporting data across a peer-to-peer links between NFC devices. With an increasing number of applications of the NFC and NDEF technology, more and more security threats became apparent. The signature record type is supposed to increase security for NDEF application by providing authenticity and integrity to the NDEF data. This paper takes a close look on the recently published Signature Record Type Definition and discusses its various security aspects. First, we introduce the signature record type and its usage. After that, we analyze the security aspects of the current signature method. Finally, we disclose multiple security vulnerabilities of the current Signature Record Type Definition and propose measures to avoid them.
The NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) is a standardized format for storing formatted data on NFC (Near Field Communication) tags and for transporting data across a peer-to-peer NFC link. Through NDEF and its various record types, events can be triggered on an NFC device by simply touching an NFC-enabled object. The number of use cases and real applications around NFC and NDEF technology increases continuously. However, existing applications provide hardly any protection against (malicious) manipulation of NDEF data. Digital signatures are a means of providing authenticity and integrity of NDEF data. Therefore, the NFC Forum - which is responsible for the specification of data formats, protocols and applications in regard to the NFC technology - is working on adding digital signatures to their NDEF format. While their signature record type is still in draft status and has not been released to the public, this paper discusses the various aspects of digitally signing NDEF records. First, we introduce the readers to the NFC Data Exchange Format, its use cases and its potential security threats. After that, we describe the potential of digital signatures for NDEF messages. Finally, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various ways to digitally sign an NDEF message.
Near Field Communication’s card emulation mode is a way to combine smartcards with a mobile phone. Relay attack scenarios are well-known for contactless smartcards. In the past, relay attacks have only been considered for the case, where an attacker has physical proximity to an NFC-enabled mobile phone. However, a mobile phone introduces a significantly different threat vector. A mobile phone’s permanent connectivity to a global network and the possibility to install arbitrary applications permit a significantly improved relay scenario. This paper presents a relay attack scenario where the attacker no longer needs physical proximity to the phone. Instead, simple relay software needs to be distributed to victims’ mobile devices. This publication describes this relay attack scenario in detail and assesses its feasibility based on measurement results.