Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the demands of the core stakeholders and how these stakeholders drive the information disclosure behaviors of the enterprise and local government.Design/methodology/approach: Content analysis was conducted. The authors collected and analyzed information disclosure laws and regulations regarding environmental emergencies in China, as well as related media reports and official accident investigation report about the oil pipeline leakage and explosion accident in City Q. The authors divided the whole process of the accident into four stages, i.e., the prodromal stage, acute stage, chronic stage, and resolution stage, and then analyzed the different demands of stakeholders and the different information disclosure behaviors of the enterprise and local government during these four stages.Findings: During the environmental emergency, the enterprise and local government exhibited information disclosure behaviors for their own benefits. There was severe information asymmetry between the enterprise and local government. Local government acted more positively in terms of information disclosure than the enterprise due to the demands of stakeholders. There were significant differences between the driving effects of different stakeholders. The effects of central government and local communities were the strongest, followed by news media and environmental organizations, whereas general public had the weakest impact. In addition, the effects of stakeholders on the information disclosure varied throughout different stages.Originality/value: This paper considered a Chinese typical case study, thereby providing details of information disclosure behaviors of the enterprise and local government during an environmental emergency, and making comparative analysis on the driving effects on information disclosure by different stakeholders.

The government plays a crucial role in regulating the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). We investigated the reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) for the manufacturer and the subsidy mechanism (SM) for the collector in CLSCs. The government’s goal is to maximize social welfare. Based on the centralized and decentralized decision-making models without government intervention, we developed two CLSC models where the government rewards or penalizes the manufacturer and subsidizes the collector. Then, the impact of government input cost and environmental benefit coefficients on the decision variable, firm’s profit and social welfare was analyzed. We found the following conclusions: (i) both RPM and SM increase the collection rate and the profit of CLSC partners, while the price of a new product decreases if the environmental benefit coefficient is moderate; (ii) social welfare and the profits of the manufacturer and retailer under RPM are higher than under SM, while a collector’s profit under RPM is lower than that under SM; (iii) RPM is more feasible to implement in terms of the higher collection rate, buyback price and social welfare. These conclusions could provide several managerial implications for both the government and partners of the CLSC.