Product quality and pricing, as the important competitive tools, play a key role in attracting consumers. In a supply chain, the decisions on product quality and pricing are usually interlinked and would influence the cooperation relation between the members, especially when they are fairness-concerned and have different bargaining power. However, linking the quality and pricing decisions to the decision-makers’ behavioral factors such as fairness concern draws a little attention in the literature of supply chain management. This paper incorporates the members’ fairness preference and bargaining power into the product quality and pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain, where the supplier offers core components with a certain quality level to the downstream manufacturer, who subsequently sells the final products in the end market. Both the supplier and the manufacturer are assumed to be fairness-concerned by adopting Nash bargaining solutions as their fairness reference points. We use game-theoretic models to analyze the equilibrium product quality and pricing strategies under the setting of integrated and decentralized supply chain, respectively. Detailed comparisons and sensitivity analysis are further conducted to examine the impacts of members’ strengths of fairness concern, bargaining power, and decision structure on their equilibrium product quality and pricing strategies and corresponding payoffs.

In the context of developing the digital platform economy, trade-in programs have become an effective strategy for e-commerce platforms to stimulate consumption. Many head e-commerce platforms have launched their own trade-in programs. However, the existing research on trade-in programs is still stuck in the traditional trade-in model. The purpose of this study is to explore whether there is a new and more beneficial trade-in program. In this paper, we construct the Stackelberg game model between a brand owner and a B2C e-commerce platform under two trade-in programs and use optimization theory to obtain the equilibrium results of the model. The results indicate that the performance improvement of the new-generation product will promote the increase in two-generation products’ price under traditional trade-in programs, the price of the new-generation product will increase, and the price of the previous-generation product will decrease under new trade-in programs. The brand owner always prefers traditional trade-in to new trade-in. However, the e-commerce platform prefers traditional trade-in to new trade-in just when the previous-generation product is durable enough and the performance improvement of a new-generation product is small enough; otherwise, it prefers new trade-in to traditional trade-in. These findings are beneficial to the operational practices of e-commerce platforms and brand owners.

In reaction to evolving consumer preferences, prominent platforms, such as Amazon and JD, have progressively established proprietary store brands. However, the problems related to the sourcing of store brands and the disclosure of their quality information remain uncertain. To fill this gap, this paper utilizes game theory to develop a supply chain consisting of a national brand manufacturer, a third-party manufacturer, and a platform, focusing on the platform’s optimal sourcing strategy—determining whether to source its store brand from the national or third-party manufacturer—while also considering its quality disclosure strategy. We then examine how essential elements, specifically the brand spillover effect and the disclosure cost, influence these strategic decisions. Our research reveals that the quality information disclosure of the store brand occurs when the product quality surpasses a predetermined threshold. Additionally, although the elevated disclosure cost consistently diminishes quality disclosure, the impact of the brand spillover effect on quality disclosure is nonlinear. Finally, the platform’s sourcing strategy depends greatly on the brand spillover effect and the disclosure cost. Specifically, when the brand spillover effect is relatively large (small), the platform prefers to source the store brand from the national (third-party) manufacturer; with a moderate brand spillover effect, a higher (lower) disclosure cost encourages the platform to source from the national (third-party) manufacturer.

Information asymmetry between manufacturers and online retailers regarding consumer preferences for store brands profoundly influences operational strategy. By leveraging information technology, online retailers can collect valuable consumer data, creating a strategic dilemma: whether to share this information with manufacturers and, if so, with which manufacturer (national or third-party). This study aims to explore an online retailer’s strategic decisions regarding sharing information with manufacturers, filling a gap in the literature on store brands and consumer preferences. Using game theory, we analyze the interactions among an online retailer, a national manufacturer, and a third-party manufacturer, incorporating the Hotelling model to capture consumer preference and product differentiation. Our findings reveal that information sharing does not consistently benefit the online retailer or manufacturers. Notably, without side payment, the online retailer is unwilling to share information with either manufacturer, and manufacturers do not always gain more from receiving such information—a result that challenges conventional wisdom. However, when side payment is introduced, the online retailer’s willingness to share information depends on key factors: the probability of low brand loyalty (low-type) consumers, the proportion of comparison shoppers, the side payment, and the degree of information uncertainty. These findings provide innovative insights for operations managers, highlighting the critical role of information management in shaping strategic decisions and enhancing the efficacy and financial outcomes of information sharing in the context of store brands.