Income inequality is widespread in human society and has important implications for human behavior. People's perception of the environment bridges income inequality and individual behavioral decisions. Existing research suggests that social income inequality is usually biased, either overestimated or underestimated. However, such phenomena have not been fully explored with quantitive prove, especially in the working environment based on performance data of actual production. In fact, the correct perception of people is the basis of a fair environment for their production decisions. Thus, the perception bias may weaken the adaptability and competitiveness of a company in the market. This paper first confirms the prevalence of individual perception bias of income inequality within the working environment based on actual production data. Our results show that people tend to underestimate income inequity around them, and this underestimation grows with the real unfairness of the working environment. Further, this paper proposes a network generation-based framework with a three-layer structure to correct perception bias using a cooperative network reengineering approach. Within the framework, a homophily-based generative network model is proposed as the key algorithm. Our simulation results show that our proposed framework effectively reduces individuals' perception bias of income inequality.
Game theory provides a powerful means to study human cooperation and better understand cooperation-facilitating mechanisms in general. In classical game-theoretic models, an increase in group cooperation constantly increases people’s gains, implying that individual gains are a continuously varying function of the cooperation rate. However, this is inconsistent with the increasing number of risk-resistant scenarios in reality. A risk-resistant scenario means once a group does not successfully resist the risk, all individuals lose their resources, such as a community coping with COVID-19 and a village resisting a flood. In other words, individuals’ gains are segmented about the collaboration rate. This paper builds a risk-resistant model to explore whether punishment still promotes collaboration when people resist risk. The results show that central and peer punishments can both encourage collaboration but with different characteristics under different risk-resistant scenarios. Specifically, central punishment constrains the collaboration motivated by peer punishment regardless of risk, while peer punishment limits the collaboration induced by central punishment only when the risk is high. Our findings provide insights into the balance between peer punishment from public autonomy and central punishment from central governance, and the proposed model paves the way for the development of richer risk-resistant models.
Sanctioning institutions widely exist in human society. Although these institutions play an important role in the management of social affairs, sanctions are often seen to be costly in terms of both time and money. To enable sanctioning institutions to develop effective sanctions, we propose a negative feedback punishment approach for these institutions that combines the feedback control principle and the negative correlation principle. In the negative feedback punishment approach, the punishment intensity imposed on the group is negatively correlated with the current group cooperation proportion. Through evolutionary simulation and theoretical analysis, we found that the negative feedback punishment approach facilitates more stable, time-saving and low-cost performance by sanctioning institutions than other punishment methods. This work offers a feasible solution for sanctioning institutions to solve social dilemmas and provides a possible theoretical starting point for investigating effective pool punishment measures.