The establishment of an efficient reverse supply chain is important, especially in the electronics industry, considering the environmental and resource pressures worldwide. Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR), an important environmental policy approach, has been adopted extensively in various countries, and the effectiveness of its implementation has been proven through practical application. However, the establishment and development of EPR are lacking in most developing countries where collection and recycling systems are underdeveloped. This study addresses this problem by exploring the hierarchical relationship among the driving factors of EPR in the electronics industry in China and by identifying and ranking the factors that are critical in EPR implementation. As important managerial conclusions, research results show that EPR-related laws and regulations, the consciousness of senior executives, and corporate image are the three most important driving factors of EPR implementation.

The performance of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) plays a very important role in guiding enterprises’ choice of EPR practices. Meanwhile, suppliers’ behavior and green operations may influence manufacturers’ social image and operations. Thus, governance mechanisms for suppliers may impact the performance of EPR practices. Therefore, from the perspective of supply chain governance, this paper first studies the relationship of manufacturers’ EPR practices and operation performance and then introduces three types of supplier governance mechanisms (contract governance, relationship governance and equity governance) to explore the influences on manufacturers’ performance. Survey data collected from enterprises in the electronics industry in China show the relationship between manufacturers’ EPR practices and performance, as well as the effect of the three proposed governance mechanisms on the performance of EPR practices. The conclusions obtained in this study suggest that manufacturers’ EPR practices can significantly improve their environmental and market performances. At the same time, manufacturers can adjust their operation performance according to the choice of supplier governance mechanism, which is chosen based on the operation objectives of the enterprises. To be specific, if the enterprises want to obtain better environmental performance and improve their social image, they should choose a contract governance mechanism that explicitly stipulates the responsibility and obligation of the supplier. In addition, the three proposed governance mechanisms can improve the market performance of enterprises in EPR practices.

At present, corporate social responsibility has been widely mentioned by the international society, especially platform enterprises. For a platform that assumes social responsibilities, consumer surplus is a rather critical aspect, and product quality is one of the most important factors directly related to consumers. This paper studies a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailing platform, in which the retailing platform procures products from the manufacturer. The manufacturer produces the products and decides the product quality. We consider two channel structures of the manufacturer and the retailing platform in the reseller mode and marketplace mode. Based on the model analysis and discussions, we obtain some managerial insights that are helpful in commercial practice. For the retailing platform, it has to suffer a loss in economic profit to care more about consumer surplus and become a social responsibility platform. In addition, its social responsibility plays different roles in different channel structures. In the marketplace mode, a social responsibility retailing platform helps to improve product quality. In the reseller mode, the retailing platform’s social responsibility does not make a change in product quality. Furthermore, the product quality in the reseller mode is always higher than that in the marketplace mode. From the perspective of economic profits, the manufacturer obtains higher profits in the reseller mode than the marketplace mode. The retailing platform obtains higher profits in the marketplace mode than the reseller mode.

Under the increasing environmental pressure, remanufacturing has increasingly become a new mode of recycling economy and upgrading and transforming the equipment manufacturing industry. Some enterprises include remanufacturing businesses in the original production system by holding or controlling shares in other remanufacturing enterprises. This paper builds a two-echelon supply chain model composed of a supplier, a manufacturer, and a remanufacturer, considering the different ownership structures (i.e., shareholding and share-controlling) between them, in which the supplier sells non-remanufacturable parts to the manufacturer and the remanufacturer. At the same time, the optimal decisions of each firm are considered. The results show that for the manufacturer, a higher shareholding ratio means that it can obtain more profits. For the supplier, the impact of the shareholding ratio depends on the manufacturing cost. When the manufacturing cost is relatively low, the stock sharing relationship between the manufacturer and the remanufacturer will decrease the supplier’s profit. When the manufacturing cost is relatively high, it will depend on the shareholding ratio. In the case of shareholding between the manufacturer and the remanufacturer, a higher shareholding ratio will decrease the supplier’s profit. From the perspective of the supply chain, when the production cost is high enough, the supply chain’s profit decreases first and then increases with the shareholding ratio. Furthermore, the increase in the manufacturer’s shareholding in remanufacturing does not always improve the remanufacturing proportion of products.